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NEO-ORIENTALIST FRAMING OF THE 2011 AND 2013 EGYPTIAN UPRISINGS: A CASE STUDY OF *THE NEW YORK TIMES* AND *THE WASHINGTON POST*

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

1.1.1. The Uprisings in MENA: a Brief Summary

Since late 2010-early 2011, citizens of several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region organized massive demonstrations, expressing their discontent with poor social and economic conditions and political repression. According to Gelvin (2012), the protests were triggered by years of authoritarian rule and related political, economic, and social grievances: restricted civil rights, limited opportunities for political activism, intrusive executive branch, state control over the media and other institutions, extended state of emergency (in Syria since 1963, in Egypt since 1981, etc.), low quality of welfare services, high perception of corruption in the state bureaucracy, and Neoliberal economic policies that made large portions of the population vulnerable to crises (Gelvin 2012: 4-5, 21).

Demonstrations first began in Tunisia after the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor. In the following months, protests erupted in other MENA countries, including Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and United Arab Emirates (Blight, Pulham, and Torpey 2012).

1.1.2 The Egyptian Uprisings: a Brief Summary

Soon after Tunisia, demonstrations began in Egypt. According to Joya (2011), few days before January 25, when massive protests erupted, Egyptian ruling classes denied any probability of “Tunisian style” unrests in Egypt (Joya 2011: 368). Even though the subsequent developments were unpredicted, Joya explains that growing popular discontent had been periodically expressed in strikes and demonstrations (Joya 2011: 368). One of the driving forces behind popular discontent was the Neoliberal turn in Egypt’s economic policies, proposed by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to economic Neoliberalism, states should refrain from controlling the market and should only create proper conditions for free markets to function. To ensure such conditions, states should privatize public enterprises and encourage the development of private sector (Joya 2011: 370). Correspondingly, states should also cut down spending on public services, such as healthcare and education. In

Egypt, this policy “transferred public resources into the hands of new economic elite” (Joya 2011: 370). Hence, income gaps and social tensions increased. While the political elites lived in luxurious gated communities (Joya 2011: 368), 67 percent of Egyptians lived “on less than two dollars a day” (Gelvin 2012: 34). Egyptian labor unions had long been demanding better work conditions, higher wages, lower prices for food and housing, and basic social services, such as education and healthcare. As the government proposed further cuts, these economic demands intensified and aligned with the political demands of different groups, including the young activists, nationalists, liberals, leftists, Islamists, etc. (Joya 2011: 370). Thus, the Egyptian uprisings of January 2011 were not as abrupt as they might seem at a glance; indeed, they represented “the culmination of years of frustration by Egyptian workers and citizens who experienced economic austerity coupled with police brutality” (Amar 2011, cited in Joya 2011: 374).

After 18 days of protest, President Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11. In the following Parliamentary elections of November 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the strongest opposition groups, received the majority of votes, followed by Salafi Islamists and finally by liberal, secular, and centrist parties. In 2012, the first Presidential elections in Egypt’s history brought Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood member, to power (Housden 2013:72). However, the new government proved incapable of solving Egypt’s problems. As Al-Awadi notes, assessing Morsi’s rule is hard, given its short-term character (Al-Awadi 2013: 545). However, a number of governing mistakes can be noted. The Brotherhood lacked governing experience; it did not have clear strategies or foreign policy vision (Gerges 2013: 196). In fact, the Brotherhood decided to participate in the elections despite the promises that it would not do so (Al-Awadi 2013: 545). Also breaking the promise to engage the opposition groups, Morsi tried to increase control over the Shura Council, the Upper House of the Egyptian Parliament, and Egyptian governorships by appointing fellow Brotherhood members (Housden 2013:73-74). Moreover, he was unable to mediate among dominant Egyptian institutions: the powerful military, the Mubarak-affiliated civil service, and the judiciary, which declared the Shura Council unconstitutional and declined Morsi’s law proposals to increase presidential authority (Housden 2013: 74). Morsi’s presidency was further complicated by tough economic situation, albeit it is worth noting that unemployment and inflation further increased during his rule (Al-

Awadi 546). These circumstances triggered another wave of demonstrations in June 2013, which culminated in Morsi's removal, facilitated by the Egyptian military (Housden 2013: 72).

1.2 THE RESEARCH TOPIC

More than three years after the onset of the uprisings, the situation in Egypt remains unstable. As a result, the Egyptian political processes have remained under media scrutiny both nationally and internationally. This thesis critically examines the US media framing of the Egyptian Uprisings in 2011 and 2013 to examine whether the coverage was relatively value-neutral or had a value-laden (Neo-Orientalist) perspective. The thesis focuses on Neo-Orientalism since, as further explained in Chapter 2, numerous scholars (Sadowski 1993, Tuastad 2003, Samiei 2010) have pointed to the Neo-Orientalist tendency among the Western societies to view religion as the key driving force behind political processes. Therefore, the thesis aims to examine whether this tendency is manifest in the US media as well, or whether the two newspapers try to represent the abovementioned political and economic processes and grievances.

1.2.1. The Research Problem: Purpose and Aim

The thesis aims to assess how the Egyptian uprisings were framed: whether the coverage reflected a particular (Neo-Orientalist) point of view, ideological positions, and political, economic, and social underpinnings, or tried to accurately represent local context and grievances. As it will be explained in Chapter 2, the Neo-Orientalist approach assumes that Islam and the Western liberal democracy are fundamentally incompatible; therefore, the process of "democratization" will either be successful in Islamic countries as Islam becomes "vulnerable to liberal ideas" (Fukuyama 1992: 46) and more "tolerant and egalitarian" (Fukuyama 1992: 216), or unsuccessful as irreconcilable differences lead to a "clash" between Islamic and Western Civilizations (Huntington 1996: 207). To examine whether either view is implicit in the US media framing of Egyptian uprisings, the thesis looks at the articles published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* during and after two major events: Mubarak's resignation in 2011 and Morsi's removal in 2013. Specifically, for the 2011 revolution, the thesis examines articles published from January 25th, the starting point of the massive 18-day demonstrations, to three days after Mubarak's resignation on February 11th and for the 2013 uprisings, the articles published from June 30th, when the massive protests erupted, to three days after Morsi's removal

on July 3rd. The thesis focuses on these two events since they attracted massive media attention locally and internationally.

To answer the main question, the thesis addresses several sub-questions. It compares the coverage of these two events in the two newspapers. It discusses which aspects were emphasized or omitted, which sources were quoted and what kind of language was used in each case. Studying the focus of media coverage, used sources, and language can help identify dominant frames, which are later critically analyzed to relate the language and framing to the wider social context, i.e. the political, social, and economic processes.

1.2.2. Relevance

Studying media frames is important because, as studies have shown, the media can influence people's perceptions and attitudes (Ana and Vučković 2010, Kitzinger and Miller 1992, van Drunen, Boomgaarden, and Vliegenthart 2012). Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the media can either enforce or reduce prejudice (Creel et al. 2011, Watson and Riffe 2013). Scholars such as Fairclough, Wodak, van Dijk, and others, have argued that media coverage of certain events holds a particular perspective or point of view, either consciously/explicitly, or subconsciously/implicitly. The media can frame issues in a certain way, and thus can influence discourse around these issues. These authors especially stress the role of the so-called Western (mainly European and North American) media; according to van Dijk, the "implicit system of rules and values... that leads to a standardized description of the [international] events" that journalists share is "established and diffused" by "Western" news agencies (van Dijk 1986:89).

Indeed, research of news discourse shows that the media can help maintain and normalize elite discourse. Studying media frames and analyzing discourse critically can therefore reveal political, economic, social, or cultural processes that underpin the discourse. Thus, the social relevance of this study lies in examining whether the news frames shaping the discourse around the Egyptian uprisings carry such underpinnings. Identifying these underpinnings is important because firstly, Egypt is one of the most populous countries in the MENA and one of the US' allies in the region. Hence, internal political processes in Egypt and its relations with other states can have implications for wider regional politics. Furthermore, Egypt is an interesting case since the Egyptian uprisings were different from similar events in other MENA countries. Egypt was

one of the few states where the protesters managed to force the leader to resign. Two years later, Egypt became the first country in the region where the elected president was ousted by the army, following massive demonstrations.

Egypt is an interesting case for research also due to scientific relevance. Studying the framing of the Egyptian uprisings can lead to important insights in the media coverage of social movements in general and the MENA uprisings in particular. If certain underpinnings of discourse are found, future analyses could examine whether similar implications lie beneath the media coverage of other social movements.

1.2.3. Literature Review

This thesis tries to fill in a gap in literature by offering quantitative and qualitative frame analysis of the Egyptian uprisings. Framing by news media has been a popular subject of research in past decades (e.g. Evans 2010, Roy 2012). Yet, media framing of the Egyptian uprisings in particular still remains understudied. Most studies have focused on nonviolent means of protest and the impact of social media (Bruns, Highfield and Burgess 2013, Howard et al. 2011, Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheaffer 2013). A number of scholars who did study media framing offered quantitative content analysis. For example, Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) studied how the uprising was framed in the Egyptian state-owned, semi-official, and social media, Robertson (2012) compared BBC's and Al Jazeera's coverage of the 2011 revolution, while Harlow and Johnson (2011) studied how the 2011 protests were framed by traditional media (*The New York Times*) vs new media (Blogs and Twitter).

Qualitative studies are relatively rare; they focus on the media coverage of the pre-2011 period or the 2011 revolution itself. For example, Pasha (2011) studied the portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian media, and Youssef (2012) compared local and international reportage of 2011 uprisings. There is lack of scholarly literature on the media coverage of the 2013 events, i.e. Morsi's military removal from presidency, probably because the event took place relatively recently. This paper tries to fill in this gap in literature and combines quantitative and qualitative research to study the US media coverage of the Egyptian uprisings in 2011 and 2013.

1.2.4. Outline of the thesis: chapters and content

After the introducing the background and the research topic in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 explains the theoretical framework: Poststructuralism, media framing, and Neo-Orientalism. Consequently, the thesis explains the used methodology: data selection, methods, and limitations of this research. Chapters 4 and 5 present the findings and conclusions from quantitative and qualitative research, Content Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis, Respectively. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the thesis and draws overall conclusions.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND MEDIA FRAMING

This paper rests on the poststructuralist view that language not only transmits, but also produces meaning. Poststructuralism belongs to the nonfoundationalist school of thought in international relations. Unlike positivists, who believe in objective reality and relate language to a “systemic ontology” or “objective truth,” nonfoundationalists regard reality as constructed and contextual and relate language to the social actor’s position in the world (Debrix 2003: 4). Social constructivism, another nonfoundationalist approach, also highlights the importance of language. However, while constructivists consider communicators (speakers) as performers intentionally using language as a normative tool, poststructuralists emphasize the power of language itself, regardless of the communicator’s intentions (Debrix 2003: 6-7). Poststructuralists believe that “language may never be fully controlled,” i.e. language itself enacts meaning (Debrix 2003:12). For example, according to Michel Foucault (2012), the language used to describe certain events is not neutral, and the choice of words has certain implications; even seemingly neutral and objective terms can carry underlying values. Indeed, the language used to cover the Egyptian uprisings might reflect conscious or subconscious Neo-Orientalist assumptions, regardless of the journalists’ intentions. To examine whether the US media framed the Egyptian uprisings from a Neo-Orientalist perspective, the thesis thus inclines towards poststructuralism more than social constructivism.

Generally, media coverage is always biased to a certain extent; journalists and other media staff can frame the news in a particular way - they can choose what topics to cover and how to cover them, they can use metaphors or comparisons to relate the news to the already familiar phenomena, they can choose what background information or context to include in the news, etc. These decisions are not always individual. As Takens et al. (2013) explain, journalists tend to cover political events according to news values, such as personalized, or politician-focused, sensational, or contest-like, and negative reporting (Takens et al. 2013: 279). Altheide (2010) describes how the news has increasingly become “infotainment,” involving entertainment,

advertising, and popular culture (Altheide 2010: 294). This “media logic” results from the intense competition on the media market between public and commercial channels, and from technological developments, such as the advent of Internet news and social media (Takens et al. 2013: 279). In order to keep the audience’s attention, news sources “routinely package events, ... including visuals, urgency, language, and drama” to frame the news in more familiar, evocative, condensed and thematic manner (Altheide 2010: 294-5). As Altheide argues, “[this] has led to an immense simplification of politics and world events, often cast as a visual signature of complex events” (Altheide 2010: 295).

Such bias and simplification can also have other structural reasons (lack of time, resources, reliable information, etc.). Still, some scholars have argued that it can reflect underlying biases at work. For example, Galtung and Ruge (1965) argue that the media often reduce the complexity of the news about culturally distant nations. The news reduces the “remoteness” and “strangeness” into simple, homogenizing, and familiar ways of representation (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 81). Instead of following the “build-up” of events, the news covers only the major events, producing “an image of [the culturally distant] countries as dangerous, ruled by capricious elites, as unchanging in their basic characteristics, as existing for the benefit of the topdog nations, and in terms of their links to those nations. Events occur, they are sudden, like flashes of lightning, with no build-up and with no led-down after their occurrence – they just occur” (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 84). According to Ashley and Olson (1998), the media reinforce an implicit ideology that legitimizes the existing state and class institutions and disregards or criticizes dissenters of the social order: “[not] only does the news coverage diminish both the contributions and effectiveness of protest groups, it also exaggerates the threat these groups pose to mainstream society” (Ashley and Olson 1998: 263). Using framing devices, the media can delegitimize nonconformists by focusing on negative events instead of the protesters’ grievances and interests, by representing them as “social deviants,” or by disregarding them altogether (Ashley and Olson 1998: 264).

These authors show that media studies need not be limited to linguistic research that is severed from political studies. Rather, as Fairclough indicates, it is valuable to link discourse with politics. Therefore, he proposes linking discourse theory concepts (genre, argumentation,

contextualization, etc.) with political theory concepts (power, hegemony, ideology, etc.), since such approach has “greater explanatory power” (Fairclough 2010: 8).

To link discourse with politics, the thesis uses framing theory. The limitation of this approach is the lack of agreement among scholars on the exact definition of framing and other related concepts. For example, some scholars define framing and discourse as different, but related terms, sharing similar theoretical foundations (Evans 2010, Macnamara 2005, Hänggli 2012). In other cases, the distinctions between the two concepts become blurred as some scholars define framing analysis as part of discourse studies (Pasha 2011), while others define discourse analysis as one of the methods of framing analysis (Youssef 2012). Thus, to locate the thesis into wider theoretical framework, it is necessary to adhere to particular definitions of these concepts. This thesis uses Entman’s (1993) definition that has been widely cited by researchers of frame analysis (e.g. Youssef 2012, Broussard and Paul 2014, Weaver, Lively and Bimber 2009, Irvan and Atay 2013, Baysha and Hallahan 2007, Baysha and Calabrese 2011, Viswam 2013). According to Entman, framing means “[selecting] some aspects of perceived reality to make them more salient, thus promoting a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993: 52). News media frames consist of framing devices, or signifying elements, such as descriptions of actions and actors, quotes from sources, background information, etc., that construct news discourse. These elements might not necessarily produce a specific meaning, but nevertheless can be used by newsmakers to maximize the probability of getting preferred meanings across.

Since this thesis aims to examine whether the US media framed the Egyptian uprisings from a certain value-laden perspective, it is useful to pay attention not only to the framing devices, but also to the possible underlying biases. These biases can result from political, social, economic, cultural, ideological, etc. factors. This links the thesis with previous studies criticizing the Western media sources for misreporting or aligning international news with the mainstream political discourse (e.g. Ottosen et al. 2013, Abrahamian 2003).

2.2. NEO-ORIENTALISM: HUNTINGTON AND FUKUYAMA

Specifically, the paper tries to examine whether the US media framed the uprisings from a Neo-Orientalist point of view. Acknowledging a possible limitation of this approach - the lack of a

single, agreed-upon definition of Neo-Orientalism - this thesis considers Neo-Orientalism as a modern variation of Orientalism, defined by Edward Said (1978) as Western prejudice against Oriental cultures (Said 1978: 3). Focusing on the media coverage of the Egyptian uprisings, this thesis stresses the prejudice towards the Arab and Muslim world, and particularly, towards Islam and its adherents.

As Samiei (2010) points out, 19th century Europeans used the term Orient to refer to the Arab world, or to the Middle East at large: “[the] Orient ... pointed above all to the region that lay immediately to the east of Europe” (Samiei 2010:1145). The Orient is a constructed entity, not a real one misunderstood by Westerners (Said 1978: 3). The idea of the West is likewise socially constructed (Samiei 2010: 1146). This rather blurry concept can be used to refer to North America, Western Europe, Europe at large, etc. When summarizing the main Neo-Orientalist assumptions, this thesis refers to the “West” or the “Western civilization” as defined by Neo-Orientalists. For example, Huntington defines North American (US and Canada), Western European (Catholic and Protestant) countries and Australia and New Zealand as parts of the “Western civilization” (Huntington 1996: 26-27). Certainly, such mapping is problematic since it falsely unifies the abovementioned regions and introduces a simplistic distinction between the West and the rest of the world. This false homogenization and division is indeed one of the central critiques of Orientalism and Neo-Orientalism. As Said argues, Orientalists fail to recognize that the line between the Orient and the West is “not an inert fact of nature” (Said 1978: 4). As a result, Orientalist assumptions are misleading, “not because [they are] against the East, but because this approach to the world is a flawed ideology in itself” (Samiei 2010: 1146).

According to Said, the image of the Orient was constructed according to preconceived assumptions about homogeneous states whose weakness stemmed from their difference from the falsely unified West (Said 1978: 7). Orientalism assumed that the West (developed, rational, and therefore, superior) was essentially different from the Orient (underdeveloped, irrational, and therefore, inferior). Orientalism saw Islam as an all-encompassing phenomenon, different from the pluralist West, that led to political submissiveness and opposed democracy.

This perceived Self-Other dichotomy is defined as dualism (Samiei 2010: 1146). Dualist Orientalist ideology constructed the West itself by imagining the Orient as the “Other” (Scott 2008: 66). This abstract Other was objectified as something to be afraid of or something to be

studied, developed, occupied, or controlled in some way (Said 2003: 300-301, cited in Samiei 2010: 1147). The central idea was that the West-Orient dualism was “dramatic” and “essential,” making the Others “less human;” therefore, it justified Western imperial ambitions and legitimized dominance over the Others (Samiei 2010: 1146).

These assumptions also influenced the way scholars assessed the prospects of democracy in the Orient. The general consensus held that democracy failed in the Orient because one of the central democratic components - civil society - was missing. Orientalists explained the weakness of civil society by Islam’s interference in all spheres of life. Such comprehensiveness perfectly suited a totalitarian state - submissive believers obeyed not only God and religious authorities, but also their political rulers (Sadowski 1993:16).

However, since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, many academics, such as Patricia Crone, Daniel Pipes, and John Hall, consider Oriental societies as stronger than the states (Samiei 2010: 1148). According to Sadowski (1993), this new, Neo-Orientalist vision denies that Islam necessarily leads to submission. However, it shares the classical Orientalist assumption that all-encompassing Islam, the main driving force behind political and economic processes, is irreconcilable with liberal democracy (Sadowski 1993: 17). Hence, like classical Orientalism, Neo-Orientalism rests on unquestioned assumptions and constructions of the Other. As Tuastad (2003) summarizes, Neo-Orientalism is the tendency of Western (North American and West European) societies to view religion (particularly, Islam) as the key differentiator between the West and the Eastern (mainly Arab and Muslim) societies (Tuastad 2003: 594).

Even though “there is no reason to assume that Islam is any more or less compatible with democracy and human rights than Christianity or Judaism, for example” (Gelvin 2012: 7), Neo-Orientalism unquestionably shares the Orientalist assumption about the dualism between Islam and the West and between Islamism and liberal democracy. These assumptions are certainly problematic. In fact, Islam includes different movements which are far from monolithic; as Nasr (2007) points out, Islamic sects (e.g. Shias and Sunnis) can further be divided according to political views, theological opinions, religious beliefs, cultural and ethnic characteristics, customs and traditions, etc. (Nasr 2007: 24-25). Furthermore, Islamism is an umbrella term referring to groups that aspire to organize societies “according to what they consider to be Islamic principles” (Gelvin 2012: 5). As Gelvin explains, Islamist groups greatly differ in terms

of their goals or beliefs; some of them refuse to engage in politics, while others do not, and some of them favor what they call literal understandings of Islamic texts, while others do not (Gelvin 2012: 5). Neo-Orientalism simplifies these distinctions and homogenizes Islamists or even Muslims at large, assuming Islam's incompatibility with liberal democracy.

Neo-Orientalist study of politics - particularly, democratization - in the Orient attributes the chances of success to a "mysterious essence," instead of political and economic forces (e.g. imperialism and its legacy) that encourage or hinder this process (Sadowski, cited in Samiei 2010: 24). This "essence" can be seen as invincible or vulnerable to liberal ideas. The former idea is advocated by Huntington (1996), while the latter is supported by Fukuyama (1992).

2.2.1. Neo-Orientalism: Samuel Huntington

For Huntington, the dualism between Islam and the West leads to the "clash of civilizations" (1996: 207). He defines civilization as "the broadest cultural entity" (Huntington 1996: 43), "the biggest "we" within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other "thems"" (Huntington 1996: 43). Even though civilization includes many elements of culture, such as language, values, traditions, etc., the main distinguishing factor is religion (Huntington 1996: 42). Huntington divides the modern world into seven major civilizations, linking them with the world's major religions (Huntington 1996: 45-47).

Huntington rejects the idea that world is evolving towards a "universal civilization" (Huntington 1996: 56). He argues that the worldwide spread of Western ideas and values is improbable since even if non-Western civilizations modernize, they will never democratize or completely embrace the Western civilization: "Somewhere in the Middle East a half-dozen young men could well be dressed in jeans, drinking Coke, listening to rap, and, between their bows to Mecca, putting together a bomb to blow up an American airliner" (Huntington 1996: 58). This simplistic, highly stereotypical representation highlights Huntington's Neo-Orientalist assumptions. He reinforces the idea of dualism by contrasting democracy and Islam (thus, also democratic and Islamist movements). He argues that while the Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and some East Asian countries followed the Western example and transitioned from authoritarianisms to democracies, Oriental countries embraced the growth of Islamist forces against authoritarian regimes (Huntington 1996:114). Following the Neo-Orientalist logic, Huntington attributes the

success of democratization not to political or economic forces, but to religion and its underlying essence. He ignores the legacy of colonialism and imperialism, stating that Islam's "anti-modern core ... [dooms] any further political development" (Tuastad 2003: 595). Like other Orientalists and Neo-Orientalists, Huntington views Islam as all-encompassing and claims that Muslim societies see Islam as "the solution" (Huntington 1996: 109). He argues that prospects of democratization are higher in countries with a Western Christian past and lower in countries with an Islamic or Asian religious background (Huntington 1996: 193). Interestingly, Huntington expects democratization (to a certain extent) in Asian countries due to their economic ties with the West (Huntington 1996: 195). By contrast, he concludes, "democratic prospects in the Muslim republics are bleak" (Huntington 1996: 193), but solely because of the "inhospitable nature of Islamic culture and society to Western liberal concepts" (Huntington 1996: 114), not because of political or economic factors.

Thus, instead of evolving towards a unifying civilization, he argues, the West and the Rest will inevitably come to an inter-civilizational conflict (Huntington 1996: 28). He disregards the constructed nature of the West and the Orient and argues that the dividing line between the two worlds will develop into a battlefield as a result of "Western arrogance" and "Islamic intolerance" (Huntington 1996: 185).

Importantly, Huntington shares the Neo-Orientalist assumption that imagines the people in the Orient as homogeneous enemies. He rejects the view that the main enemies of the West are radical Islamists, not Islam itself: "Some Westerners ... have argued that the West does not have problems with Islam but only with violent Islamist extremists. Fourteen hundred years of history demonstrate otherwise" (Huntington 1996: 209). He argues that Islam and the Western world have always been engaged in inter-civilizational conflict. The reasons behind this conflict, he explains, are that Islam governs all spheres of life, whereas Western Christianity is separate from the political realm, and also that both religions are universalistic, missionary, and teleological (Huntington 1996: 211). These differences, he concludes, will also shape the future relations between these two civilizations (Huntington 1996: 217-218):

"The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their

power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world. These are the basic ingredients that fuel conflict between Islam and the West.”

Huntington goes further, suggesting that Islam has “bloody borders” (Huntington 1996: 254). He observes major conflicts between Arabs and their neighbors and concludes that “at the macro or global level of world politics the primary clash of civilizations is between the West and the rest, at the micro or local level it is between Islam and the others” (Huntington 1996: 255). Stressing an essentially violent nature of Islam (as opposed to essentially peaceful liberal democracies), he attributes this violence not to any political or economic grievances, but to religion. Some of the possible reasons behind such violent nature, he notes, could be the militarist origins of Islam, its absolutist nature, its proximity to non-Muslim groups, and most importantly, the absence of core Islamic states and large number of unemployed male Muslim youths (Huntington 1996: 265).

To avoid the inter-civilizational conflict between Islam and the West, Huntington suggests that the countries in the West refrain from intervening in other civilizations and advocating democracy. He argues that the promotion of the Western culture as universal and the intervention in other civilizations’ internal affairs makes inter-civilizational conflict inevitable (Huntington 1996: 316).

2.2.2. Neo-Orientalism: Francis Fukuyama

Fukuyama (1992) agrees that the fundamental West-Islam dualism results from Islam’s disapproval of liberal democracy. However, he sees Islam as susceptible and argues that liberal democracy is an inevitable end. Like classical Orientalists, Fukuyama considers the Western model as a normative standard by which to assess the democratization process in the Orient. He advances a teleological argument, presenting Western liberal democracy as the “telos,” or an endpoint that human progress leads to (Fukuyama 1992: 138).

Fukuyama traces the failure of several authoritarian and totalitarian states and tries to explain their transition towards democracy. He argues that Right-wing authoritarian states (e.g. Spain

under Francisco Franco) - states which tried to use “strong” state power to invade the citizens’ private sphere - failed to control their civil society that opposed military rule (Fukuyama 1992:39). On the other hand, Left-wing totalitarian states (e.g. the Soviet Union) - states which pursued total control over individuals, including their views and beliefs - failed because people “retained an ability to think for themselves” and challenged their governments (Fukuyama 1992:29). Citizens of both authoritarian and totalitarian states, he argues, judged their governments according to liberal democratic standards and thus recognized flaws in them (Fukuyama 1992: 31). As a result, “many former authoritarianisms have now given way to democracy, while the former post-totalitarian states have become simple authoritarianisms, if not democracies” (Fukuyama 1992: 40). He explains these transitions with the evolutionary, teleological nature of history. This coherent process, he claims, “[takes] into account the experience of all peoples in all times” (Fukuyama 1992: xii) and leads all humanity to its “telos” - liberal democracy, “an ideology of potentially universal validity” (Fukuyama 1992: 42).

Fukuyama defines liberal democracy as “the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty” and distinguishes between its two building blocks: liberalism and democracy (Fukuyama 1992: 42). Firstly, he defines liberalism as “a rule of law that recognizes certain [civil, religious and political] individual rights or freedoms from government control” (Fukuyama 1992: 42). Secondly, he defines democracy as a system in which citizens and the government share political power. Hence, a country can be considered democratic if all citizens have an equal right to elect their government (Fukuyama 1992: 43). These two building blocks, he argues, are interrelated, but not necessarily inseparable. Indeed, he claims, some fairly democratic countries are illiberal states (Fukuyama 1992: 44). However, the worldwide process of democratization gradually leaves less and less viable options of political and economic organization (Fukuyama 1992: 45). Liberal democracy, he concludes, is the only sustainable form that all countries are transitioning to. As Samiei notes, Fukuyama reinforces the Orientalist doctrine that equates modernization with “absolute Westernization,” disregards the limits of Western liberal democratic traditions, and fails to acknowledge diversity (Samiei 2010: 1156).

Fukuyama believes that Islam remains the main threat to the transition to democracy. Like classical orientalists, Fukuyama argues that this “totalistic” (Fukuyama 1992: 217) religion that controls public and private spheres alike has “defeated” liberal democratic principles in some

parts of the world (Fukuyama 1992:45). However, he claims, in the long run, Islam will prove more susceptible to liberal ideas than the other way around (Fukuyama 1992:46). Fukuyama would disagree with Huntington's view that Islam rejects democracy. In fact, he argues that democracy, one of the two building blocks of a liberal democratic system, is already present in Islamic societies, since Islam, like Christianity, accepts "universal human equality" (Fukuyama 1992: 217). Even though the other building block, liberalism, is more problematic, he argues, liberalization will eventually reach Islamic societies. Indeed, he notes, liberal ideas have already "attracted numerous and powerful Muslim adherents" (Fukuyama 1992: 46).

As this liberalization process continues, Fukuyama believes that Islamic countries will establish closer relationships with the West, which will increase the economic costs of war, but will not necessarily guarantee the establishment of liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992:262). To see a causal connection between modernization and democratization, he argues, it is necessary to look at the universal, trans-historical values, such as "inner freedom" and "dignity" (Fukuyama 1992: 161). Unlike Huntington, Fukuyama believes that these values will overcome the challenges of "irrational" nationalism and fundamentalist religion and will enable "rational" pursuit of self-interest by accepting democratic principles of participation, secularism, tolerance, etc. (Fukuyama 1992: 214). Thus, with a Neo-Orientalist focus on the strength of civil society, he notes that formerly violent Islamic fundamentalists will also accept the essentially "un-warlike character of liberal societies" (Fukuyama 1992: 262). Hence, Fukuyama reinforces the erroneous Orientalist assumption that the West is rational, inherently peaceful, and superior to the irrational, homogeneous fundamentalists in the Orient.

Fukuyama accepts stereotypical generalizations about "national character" (Fukuyama 1992: 224), which, he argues, can influence economic development and determine the "wealth or poverty of nations" (Fukuyama 1992:234). Thus, like other Neo-Orientalists, Fukuyama disregards the colonialist and imperial legacies and explains the current political and economic problems by an essence hindering successful modernization of Islamic countries and effective adoption of the superior Western ideas (Fukuyama 1992:237). However, he believes that over time this character can be transformed. He argues that eventually, the Orient will learn to look beyond its traditional environment (Fukuyama 1992: 306). Fukuyama thus reinforces Orientalist and colonialist constructions of the Orient as something to be developed and dominated upon. As

Narayan (1995) explains, colonialism conceived “the colonized as childish and inferior subjects, in need of the paternalistic guidance and rule of their superiors” (Narayan 1995: 133). Colonialists justified their domination over the colonized with the “white man’s burden,” the responsibility and obligation to civilize the childlike Oriental people (Narayan 1995: 134). As a result, the actions taken in the name of care for the “underdeveloped” in fact obscured the exploitation of the underprivileged (Narayan 1995: 138). Indeed, Fukuyama reinforces this discourse by arguing that as the Oriental cultures learn from successful Western liberal democracies (e.g. the United States), they will be able to challenge the traditional norms that endanger them with a “prolonged childhood” (Fukuyama 1992: 243-244).

Unlike Huntington, Fukuyama believes that economic ties and technological development, as well as the universal human values, will lead to an increasing “homogenization of mankind” (Fukuyama 1992: 244) and produce liberal democracies (Fukuyama 1992: 316). He acknowledges that democracy cannot be established overnight, through a single election - it can “never enter through the back door” (Fukuyama 1992: 220-222). He considers an explicit political will necessary. Liberalism, he argues, “must reach beyond its own principles to succeed” (Fukuyama 1992: 222). Thus, in contrast with to Huntington, Fukuyama seems to support the promotion of liberal democratic ideas beyond the West.

2.2.3. Neo-Orientalism: Summary

As demonstrated above, Huntington and Fukuyama disagree on the chances of democratization in Islamic societies. However, they share a number of Neo-Orientalist assumptions. To begin with, both authors disregard the socially constructed nature of the West and the Orient. Homogenizing both entities, they presuppose dualism between liberal democracy and Islam or Islamism, as well as between liberal democrats and adherents of Islam or Islamists.

Based on Neo-Orientalist assumptions, both authors consider Islam a homogeneous, all-encompassing phenomenon, influencing political processes in the Arab world. Instead of examining political and economic contexts, they essentialize Islam’s “Otherness” and attribute violence and instability to “traits embedded in local cultures” that characterize the “homogeneous Islamic terrorist enemy” of the civilized world (Samiei 2010: 1149).

Likewise, both authors relate the chances of democratization to Islam's ability to internalize liberal ideas than to political or economic forces. Both authors perceive Western liberal democracy as a normative political model – Fukuyama is more explicit, stressing its potential universality, and Huntington is relatively implicit, contrasting the peaceful nature of Western systems with the violent nature of Islam. They seem to agree that spreading liberal democracy would pacify international relations, even if Huntington discards Fukuyama's hopes of such prospects.

Huntington and Fukuyama also disagree on several points. While Huntington denies the existence of universal, inter-civilizational values, Fukuyama argues that all humans share universal desires of freedom and dignity. Correspondingly, if Huntington claims that despite economic modernization, the democracy-Islam dualism will prevent democratization in Islamic countries, Fukuyama believes that this difference will gradually diminish as the universal human needs, together with technological development, lead to liberal democratization.

Furthermore, Huntington argues that Western states should abstain from imposing democracy on Islamic countries, avoiding the clash between civilizations. By contrast, Fukuyama claims that spreading democracy in Islamic countries is desirable, since Western intervention would encourage the spread of liberal democracy worldwide.

Certainly, these Neo-Orientalist assumptions are “deeply flawed” and the study of democratization should research political, economic, etc. factors instead of focusing on some “mysterious essence” (Sadowski 1993: 20) stemming from religion (Al-Braizat 2002: 271, 292). However, the aim of this thesis is not to criticize Neo-Orientalism comprehensively or to assess the prospects of democratization in Egypt. Rather, the thesis tries to assess whether these Neo-Orientalist beliefs are “universalized” (Tuastad 2003: 595). Specifically, the thesis aims to examine whether the US media framing of the Egyptian uprisings in 2011 and 2013 adhered to Neo-Orientalist views. First, the paper uses the assumptions summarized above to identify Neo-Orientalist frames in the US media coverage of the Egyptian Uprisings. If such frames are found, the paper studies whether they incline towards Huntington's belief in the inevitable clash between Islam and the West, or towards Fukuyama's belief in the Western liberal democratic future.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1. DATA SELECTION

To examine whether the US media framed the Egyptian uprisings from a Neo-Orientalist perspective, the thesis analyzes articles from two major US newspapers, *The New York Times* and *the Washington Post*.

These sources were selected for several reasons. *The New York Times* (NYT) was the third largest circulated newspaper in the United States in 2011, and second largest in 2013, and *The Washington Post* (WP) was the sixth largest in 2011, and the largest in 2013 (*Huffington Post* 2011-2013). As large newspapers covering national and international news, both NYT and WP set the agenda for other news sources (Izadi and Saghaye-Biria 2007: 148).

Additionally, both NYT and WP are considered as elite newspapers (Izadi and Saghaye-Biria 2007: 148). Indeed, scholars have criticized both publications for biased coverage, reinforcing dominant discourses (Abrahamian 2003, Ashley and Olson 1998, Dunsky 2007, Evans 2010, Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, Peteet 2005, Regier and Khalidi 2009). This thesis explores whether similar conclusions can be drawn from these newspapers' framing of the Egyptian uprisings. According to Wittebols (2006), the US media coverage of foreign protest movements largely corresponds with the US foreign policy (Wittebols 2006: 346). However, Wittebols focuses on television, while this thesis assesses whether this statement holds true for the print media, specifically, the two major newspapers.

The analysis focuses on written text, since news stories are covered in articles more profoundly than in other forms (e.g. photographs).¹ To offer comprehensive analysis, the thesis studies both editorials that largely reflect the newspapers' point of view, and news items that are supposedly objective and value-neutral² (Roy 2012: 559).

Using the *LexisNexis* database³, the thesis studies the articles published during and shortly after the events. For the 2011 revolution, the thesis examines articles published from January 25th, the starting point of the massive 18-day demonstrations, to several days after Mubarak's resignation on February 11th. During the timeframe 25.01.2011- 14.02.2011, the search yields 175 results, including 97 news articles (63 from NYT and 34 from WP) and 78 editorials (37 from NYT and 41 from WP). As for the 2013 events, the thesis studies articles published from June 30th, when the massive protests erupted, to several days after Morsi's removal on July 3rd. During the timeframe 30.06.2013-06.07.2013, the search yields 34 results, including 24 news articles (15 from NYT and 9 from WP) and 10 editorials (5 from NYT and 5 from WP). The sample sizes differ since the 2011 timeframe is larger than that of 2013; the reason is that the period between the eruption of protests and their culmination (removal of the leader) was longer in 2011 than in 2013. To make sure that the study analyzes the media coverage of both events, the sample includes articles from the eruption of protests up to three days after the culmination in each case. Before conducting analysis, all retrieved results were double-checked and articles not focusing on the Egyptian uprisings, as well as external letters to the editor, were excluded.⁴ In total, the thesis analyzes 209 units, including 121 articles and 88 editorials.

To conduct framing analysis, the thesis combines quantitative and qualitative methods, namely, content analysis and critical discourse analysis. Quantitative analysis helps identify dominant concepts, the links between them, etc., whereas qualitative analysis helps identify underlying

¹ Photos and videos are excluded from the thesis since detailed analysis of all news forms would exceed the limits of this research project, especially when it comes to qualitative analysis.

² To narrow down the sample, the thesis includes news articles of more than 1000 words, assuming that longer articles would offer more detailed, comprehensive coverage. Additionally, the sample includes editorials, but excludes the letters to the editor, since the latter do not necessarily reflect the newspapers' opinion.

³ Articles about Egypt were retrieved from *LexisNexis* combined search by selecting the sources (first *The New York Times*, then *The Washington Post*) and timeframes (first 25.01.2011-14.02.2011, then 30.06.2013-06.07.2013), and indicating additional details, such as country (Egypt), sections of the newspapers (Foreign Desk, Editorial Desk), and in case of news articles, also indicating the length of the articles (above 1000 words).

⁴ In total, 31 articles (15 from *The New York Times* and 16 from *The Washington Post*) and 56 editorials (22 from *The New York Times* and 34 from *The Washington Post*) focusing on topics other than the Egyptian uprisings or representing letters to the editor (from people unaffiliated with the newspapers) were excluded.

social/cultural/political bases of frames. Such combined approach offers more insight than a strictly quantitative study, and more broadness and verifiability than a strictly qualitative study.

3.2. CONTENT ANALYSIS

3.2.1. Description of the Method

For quantitative study, the thesis uses content analysis. There are multiple definitions of this method. Macnamara (2003) lists a few; content analysis can be defined as “a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text” (Weber 1990:3, cited in Macnamara 2003: 2), as “a research technique that is based on measuring the amount of something ... in a representative sampling” (Berger 1991: 25, cited in Macnamara 2003:2), or as “a technique for gathering and analyzing the content of text,” where “[the] ‘content’ refers to words, meanings, pictures, symbols, ideas, themes, or any message that can be communicated” and “[the] ‘text’ is anything written, visual, or spoken that serves as a medium for communication” (Neuman 1997: 272-273, cited in Macnamara 2003: 2).

Content analysis takes quantitative news analysis further by defining detailed concepts and recognizing “attitudes, stereotypes, styles, symbols, values, propaganda devices” in data (Krippendorff 1980: 16). This method is useful for analyzing large amounts of data and offers “systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson 1952, cited in Krippendorff 1980: 21).

This thesis uses content analysis to identify whether the articles about the Egyptian uprisings during the abovementioned timeframes include Neo-Orientalist frames. The process follows the steps outlined in Neuendorf’s (2002) guidebook (see Appendix). According to this model, content analysis should start with developing theories and the research questions. The researcher should then conceptualize these decisions, i.e. define the components of the theories and the research questions, and operationalize them, i.e. determine the units of data collection, categories, coding schemes, etc. Next, the researcher should sample the data, code it, and report results (Neuendorf 2002: 50-51).

3.2.2. Operationalization

After outlining the research question and relevant theories, the thesis uses the key Neo-Orientalist assumptions summarized in Section 2.2 as bases for categorizing and coding each unit of analysis, i.e. each news article or editorial piece included in the sample. Content analysis of

these units is divided into two stages. First, the thesis identifies the units containing Neo-Orientalist frames. Subsequently, the thesis categorizes these units as inclining towards Huntington's or Fukuyama's ideas.

To conduct content analysis, the abstract Neo-Orientalist assumptions are operationalized, i.e. translated into concrete indicators. It is important to note that Orientalism can take different forms, so these five indicators do not sum up all Orientalist assumptions. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the particular form of Neo-Orientalism outlined in Chapter 2 is used. Keeping the main research question in mind, each of the 209 units of analysis is coded as either Neo-Orientalist in orientation, containing one or more Neo-Orientalist frames (=1), or as not Neo-Orientalist, not containing any Neo-Orientalist frames (=0), according to five indicators.

The first indicator the study looks at is whether the article assumes dualism between the Orient (specifically, Egypt, Islam, or Islamism) and the West (Western liberal democracy), contrasting the respective "readiness" for democracy of the societies at large. The second indicator is whether the article homogenizes the adherents of Islam and presents them as anti-democratic or distinguishes between radical/extremist/violent Islamists, nonviolent Islamists, pro-political participation Islamists, and other Muslim groups. The third indicator is whether instability and violence are discussed mainly in light of Islam, Islamist fundamentalism, Islam's rejection of liberal values, etc., or are linked with political and economic grievances. The fourth indicator is whether religion is seen as the main factor in Egypt's democratization by referring to the nature of Islam, Islamism, Islam's ability to internalize liberal values, etc., or by alluding to other Muslim countries (e.g. Indonesia, Algeria, Iran, Turkey) and their experiences, or if these processes are discussed without referring to religion as the only decisive factor. The fifth indicator is whether the article assumes Western liberal democracy as a model, i.e. whether it assesses the prospects or success of democratization (the establishment of a democratic system) in Egypt by comparing Egypt to the Western liberal democracy standards.

The second stage of content analysis aims to identify whether the units coded as Neo-Orientalist follow Fukuyama's or Huntington's line of thought. Thus, the units are coded as inclining more towards Fukuyama's ideas (=F), or as inclining more towards Huntington's ideas (=H), according to five indicators.

The first indicator is whether the article implies the universality of values and desires (e.g. the demand for dignity). The second indicator is whether the article sees the prospects of democratization in Egypt as hopeful or bleak; i.e. whether the article seems to imply either that universal values, together with technological development and modernization (social networks, peaceful ways of protest) will produce liberal democracy, or that the absence of universal values makes Islam incompatible with Western liberal democracy, regardless of technological development or modernization. The third indicator is whether the article implies that supporting or promoting liberal democracy in Egypt is useful/beneficial, leading to peace, or fruitless/dangerous, leading to violence and resistance. The fourth indicator is whether the article supports the US interference into Egyptian affairs to promote democracy. Finally, the fifth indicator is whether the article emphasizes more positive or negative elements, e.g. whether it highlights the peacefulness of protests, legitimizes demonstrators, repeats words like “spring,” “awakening,” “Jasmine/Twitter/Facebook Revolution,” “dignity revolution,” “peaceful,” “pro-democracy” etc., or emphasizes protesters’ violence, delegitimizes them and repeats words like “violence,” “clash,” “upheaval,” “conflict,” “massacre,” “killing,” “bloody,” “resistance,” etc.

3.2.3. Assumptions and Limitations

Content analysis is based on the assumption that the frequency of usage is important, meaning that frames become more incorporated in discourse, more “naturalized” and “routine” (Reese 2010: 30) when they are used often. This method also assumes that the researcher’s subjective interpretation can be minimized. The claim to objectivity can be questioned, since content analysis involves operationalization of abstract concepts, definition of indicators, unit categorization and coding, etc. This limitation can be addressed in two ways: by conducting analysis with two or more researchers and by clearly outlining subjective involvement in the research process. As Neuendorf stresses, coding categories and schemes should be agreed upon by two or more coders, since intercoder agreement and reliability are crucial for any content analysis (Neuendorf 2002: 12-13). As this thesis is individual, subjective judgment is inevitable at certain points. However, to maximize the validity and reliability of the analysis, Section 3.2.2 describes the operationalization process in detail, outlining codes and indicators. Furthermore, coding results are double-checked to minimize human error.

Operationalizing abstract concepts poses another challenge. Even though the Neo-Orientalist assumptions outlined in the previous chapter provide useful bases for coding, some other categories and issues can emerge during work, causing inconsistencies in data and analysis. To avoid this problem, the thesis defines categories based not only on Neo-Orientalist theories, but also on the data itself – a preliminary “qualitative scrutiny” of the articles helps finalize the coding process (Neuendorf 2002: 102). After developing the abovementioned categories, a small purposive sample of 20 articles (including 5 news items and 5 editorials from each newspaper) was examined and consequently, some categories were modified and added.

3.3. CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

3.3.1 Description of the Method

Although content analysis is useful in creating reliable “scoring categories” and “sophisticated ... statistical treatment of the results,” it does not provide deep contextual analysis of media texts (Van Dijk 1986: 1). According to Neuendorf (2002), content analysis should be used in combination with other methods in order to draw valuable inferences from texts (Neuendorf 2002: 53). For this reason, the thesis combines quantitative content analysis with qualitative critical discourse analysis (CDA). The thesis qualitatively analyzes the most dominant Neo-Orientalist frames and examines the discourse around them in the social, political, and economic context.

Generally, discourse can be defined as “text in context” (Van Dijk 1977, cited in Tischer et al. 2000: 26). More specifically, discourse can refer to a series of statements that comprise language as a “totality, the linguistic universe” (Vass 1992, cited in Tischer et al. 2000: 26). CDA stresses relations between “concrete communicative events (conversations, newspaper articles etc.) and more abstract and enduring “discourses and genres” (Fairclough 2010: 3). An alternative approach would be news analysis, but this approach focuses exclusively on the media messages “in their own right ... as specific kinds of socio-cultural practice” (Van Dijk 1986: 1), whereas CDA analyzes not the discourse in itself, but the “dialectical relations between discourse and other objects, elements or moments” (Fairclough 2010: 4) and thus sees media discourse in its wider context. Indeed, according to Wodak, CDA studies “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak 2001:2).

CDA shares the poststructuralist emphasis on the role of language. It sees language as a medium expressing and legitimizing power and domination (Habermas 1977: 259, cited in Wodak 2001: 2). Language gains power when used by powerful people; over time, these power relations become obscured and naturalized as “societal conventions” (Wodak 2001: 3). Value-laden language thus becomes naturalized, widely adopted, and, as poststructuralists would agree, influential in itself, regardless of the communicators’ intentions. CDA aims to “assist in ‘remembering’ a past that [is] in danger of being forgotten” by exposing these obscured, taken-for-granted relations (Wodak 2001: 9). Hence, CDA takes an explicit stance on the side of the unprivileged and challenges the dominant elites who either contribute to inequality or can help reduce it (Wodak 2001:10).

Therefore, CDA differs from other textual analysis methods in several ways. Firstly, it is critical: it relates data to the social context, takes an explicit political stance, and emphasizes the importance of self-reflection (Wodak 2001: 9). According to Fairclough, critique “brings a normative element into analysis” (Fairclough 2010: 7), exposes the “wrongs” in social structures and institutions, and focuses on “gaps between what particular societies claim to be (‘fair’, ‘democratic’, ‘caring’, etc.) and what they are” (Fairclough 2010:7). For the purposes of this thesis, CDA helps identify whether *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* adhere to their stated principles. *The New York Times* states that its “fundamental purpose is to protect the impartiality and neutrality of the Times and the integrity of its report” (Ethical Journalism 2004: 3-4) , and *The Washington Post* states that “ [while] arguments about objectivity are endless, the concept of fairness is something that editors and reporters can easily understand and pursue” and that its reporters are committed to “completeness,” “honesty,” and “straightforwardness” (The Washington Post Standards and Ethics). As Robert Fisk explains, contrary to the popular view, covering both sides of the story, (the so-called 50/50 coverage), does not demonstrate commitment to impartial, complete reporting (Fisk 2012):

“If you wanted to report on the 18th century slave trade would you think you were covering it fairly by talking to both the slave ships’ captains as well as the slaves? And after the Second World War, during the liberation of concentration camps, do you think it would have been fair to do ‘equal time’ between the SS officers and the Jewish survivors? And in Palestine today, in a report on the massacre of Shatila, should you give 50% of the article to the Israeli’s excuses and the

Lebanese militias – or should the majority of the article focus on the Palestinian survivors?”

Instead of adopting and reinforcing dominant discourse, he explains, “[journalists’] duty is to report on events impartially from the perspective of those suffering,” (Fisk 2012). As noted above, Neo-Orientalist framing reinforces the discourse of the dominant powers. Offering a critical perspective, CDA helps assess whether the two newspapers try to represent the voiceless or prefer a biased, Neo-Orientalist coverage.

Secondly, CDA assumes a “dialectical” relationship between text and context; powerful institutions, for example, construct “discursive events” which also shape those very institutions and structures (Fairclough 1997, cited in Tischer et al. 2000: 26). According to Fairclough, defining discourse independently of social context is impossible, since discourse is embedded in societal relations. As he puts it: “power is partly discourse, and discourse is partly power – they are different but not discrete, they ‘flow into’ each other” (Fairclough 2010: 4).

Thirdly, CDA goes beyond examining only the manifest meaning. As Wodak and Meyer (2001) explain, CDA aims to reveal both explicit and implicit “structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested through language (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 2). CDA critically studies the relationship between “discursive events” – specific instances of language use – and the wider social and cultural structures (Tischer et al. 2000:149).

3.3.2. Operationalization

As Tischer et al. (2000) explain, CDA analysts may have similar assumptions and objectives, but specific methods of research can vary (Tischer et al. 2000:144). The three major methods within CDA are associated with Ruth Wodak, Teun van Dijk, and Norman Fairclough. Wodak focuses on the ethnographic-historical research, van Dijk emphasizes cognitive effects, while Fairclough stresses the social aspect (Pasha 2011: 33). Since this paper focuses on the social context and its aim is neither to explore the historical development of US media discourse, nor to study its cognitive effects, it uses Fairclough’s (2010) approach as a general guide.

Fairclough distinguishes between three interrelated levels of CDA. The first level, description, examines discourse as text; it focuses on linguistic elements, such as naming choices, metaphors, sources of information, backgrounding or foregrounding of certain elements, presuppositions, etc. According to Izadi and Biria (2007), naming choices reflect the speakers’ attitude towards

the subject (Izadi and Biria 2007: 149). Metaphors are similarly revealing: as Musolff (2012) notes, a metaphor user can (de)emphasize political processes or (de)legitimize social groups and actors without bearing any responsibility, since metaphors, often considered as mere “rhetorical ornaments” (Musolff 2012: 301), do not require evidence and cannot be directly confronted (Musolff 2012: 303). Furthermore, quotes from implicitly knowledgeable sources legitimize the journalists’ opinions (Pasha 2011: 121-122). The journalist can either cite the source uncritically, or contradict the source by offering conflicting evidence after the quote. Finally, the journalists’ bias can become evident in the way the article foregrounds or backgrounds certain events or actors (Pasha 2011: 38). These choices can reflect underlying assumptions and presuppositions. On the first CDA stage, therefore, the thesis studies the abovementioned linguistic elements in Neo-Orientalist units identified during content analysis.

The second level, interpretation, studies discourse as discursive practice. It relates the linguistic elements to the social context, i.e. explores why journalists made certain linguistic choices, why they preferred some names or metaphors over alternative versions, why they focused on some elements of the news and backgrounded others, why they quoted certain sources and not others, etc. Hence, the second CDA stage seeks the reasons behind the lexical choices identified in the first stage.

The third level – explanation – studies discourse as social practice, related to power and ideology (Fairclough 2010: 94). According to van Dijk, ideology is “the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group” (van Dijk 1998: 8). He explains that ideology in discourse operates through an “ideological square” (Van Dijk 1998: 167), i.e. via positive depiction of the Self (emphasizing positive sides and deemphasizing negative sides) and negative depiction of the Other (emphasizing negative sides and deemphasizing positive sides). Therefore, discourse can reinforce ideology and dominant power relations.

This three-level analysis helps characterize the wider context of the US media coverage of Egyptian uprisings. Connecting the articles with Egypt-US relations and the political, economic, and social processes enables deeper analysis of the research question.

3.3.3. Assumptions and Limitations

One of the main limitations of CDA is the lack of agreement on its definition and techniques. In fact, some scholarly articles supposedly using CDA refrain from defining the approach or clearly

outlining the research process (Richardson and Barkho 2009, Kalyango 2011, Pan 2002, Brookes 1995, Kariithi and Kareithi 2007, Izadi and Saghayeh-Biria 2007). To address this limitation, this thesis follows Fairclough's approach and analyzes discourse on three levels.

Another arguable limitation is that, compared to quantitative content analysis, CDA allows more room for subjective interpretation and can be considered biased. Indeed, CDA looks at discourse from the perspective of the underprivileged. Such approach is hardly problematic, however, since it allows CDA to challenge the power elites that enable, maintain, condone, or ignore injustice or inequality. Revealing injustice and inequality, in turn, can be the first step in addressing these problems.

In addition, CDA assumes that media discourse (especially in the Western media) contributes to and preserves social inequalities. As Teun van Dijk explains, CDA maintains that discourse, power, dominance, and social inequality are interrelated (van Dijk 1993: 249-250). Importantly, CDA is explicit about these assumptions. Furthermore, as noted above, the often-preferred 50/50 coverage does not necessarily constitute impartial coverage –devoting similar time and space to the dominant and the underprivileged can, in fact, reinforce dominance. Even if doubts in CDA's assumptions are legitimate, the thesis uses CDA to assess the validity of its claims– i.e. it studies whether the assertion about the media's role in maintaining dominant narratives holds true in the case of the US media coverage of the Egyptian uprisings.

Finally, narrowing a broader research question about the US media framing of Egyptian uprisings into the analysis of written texts in NYT's and WP's coverage of 2011 and 2013 events certainly has its limitations, mostly because the scope of the thesis allows for a narrowly defined research question. However, the thesis tries to arrive at conclusions by an in-depth analysis of the data collected. A related limitation is the relatively short timeframe, as both events have remained under media scrutiny to this day. On the other hand, however, limited time period and narrower selection allow for a deeper look at the selected articles. Including news articles published several days after the decisive events (Mubarak's resignation and Morsi's removal) can show whether the tone and framing changed after the events.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONTENT ANALYSIS

4.1. STAGE ONE: FINDINGS

The first stage of the content analysis studies whether NYT and WP news and editorials about the Egyptian uprisings of 2011 and 2013 include any Neo-Orientalist frames. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the thesis analyses 209 units in total to examine whether they include the Neo-Orientalist frames summarized in Section 2.2.3 and operationalized in Section 3.2.2. The results are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2.

	25.01.11 – 14.02.11				30.06.13 – 06.07.13			
	<i>The New York Times</i>		<i>The Washington Post</i>		<i>The New York Times</i>		<i>The Washington Post</i>	
	News	Editorials	News	Editorials	News	Editorials	News	Editorials
	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %
1. Neo-Orientalist	24 38	19 51	9 26	18 44	11 73	2 40	7 78	2 40
2. Not Neo-Orientalist	39 62	18 49	25 74	23 56	4 27	3 60	2 22	3 60
Total	63 100	37 100	34 100	41 100	15 100	5 100	9 100	5 100

Table 1: Neo-Orientalist Units

	25.01.11 – 14.02.11				30.06.13 – 06.07.13			
	<i>The New York Times</i>		<i>The Washington Post</i>		<i>The New York Times</i>		<i>The Washington Post</i>	
	News	Editorials	News	Editorials	News	Editorials	News	Editorials
	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %
1. Dualism	15 24	17 46	5 15	9 22	2 13	2 40	1 11	1 20
2. Islam and Islamism: homogeneous and antidemocratic	7 11	10 27	7 21	11 27	8 53	2 40	2 22	0 0
3. Islam: linked to instability and violence	8 13	9 24	6 18	13 32	9 60	2 40	6 67	1 20
4. Islam: main factor in democratization	15 24	10 27	6 18	7 17	5 33	2 40	4 44	1 20
5. Western liberal democracy – a normative model	6 10	11 30	8 24	12 29	4 27	2 40	2 22	1 20

Table 2: Neo-Orientalist Frames

4.1.1. The 2011 Uprisings

In the NYT, 38% of news articles and 51% of editorials contain one or more Neo-Orientalist frame (see Table 1). As Table 2 shows, in news articles, the most frequently used frames are dualism and Islam as the main factor in democratization (each in 24% of the articles), followed by Islam as linked with instability and violence (13%), Islam as homogeneous and antidemocratic (11%), and Western liberal democracy as a normative model (10%). In editorials, the most dominant one is dualism (46%), followed by Western liberal democracy as a model (30%), Islam as the main factor in democratization and Islam as homogeneous and antidemocratic (27% each), and Islam linked with instability and violence (24%).

In the WP, relatively fewer units (26% of news articles and 44% of editorials) include Neo-Orientalist frames (see Table 1). Table 2 shows that most dominant frame in news articles is Western liberal democracy as a model (24%), followed by Islam as homogeneous and antidemocratic (21%), Islam as the main factor in democratization and Islam linked with instability and violence (18% each), and dualism (15%). In editorials, the most frequent frame is Islam linked with instability and violence (32%), followed by Western liberal democracy as a

model (29%), Islam as homogeneous and antidemocratic (27%), dualism (22%), and Islam as the main factor in democratization (17%).

4.1.2. The 2013 Uprisings

Neo-Orientalist framing becomes more frequent in 2013. In NYT, 73% of news articles contain one or more Neo-Orientalist frame (see Table 1). As table 2 shows, the most frequent frame is Islam linked with instability and violence (60%), followed by Islam as homogeneous and antidemocratic (53%), Islam as the main factor in Egypt's democratization (33%), Western liberal democracy as a normative model (27%), and dualism (13%). All frames are present in 40% of the editorials.

In the WP, 78% of news articles and 40% of editorials include one or more Neo-Orientalist frame (see Table 1). As demonstrated in Table 2, the most dominant frame is Islam linked with instability and violence (67%), followed by Islam as the main factor in democratization (44%), Islam as homogeneous and antidemocratic and Western liberal democracy as a model (22% each) and dualism (11%). 20% of editorials contain the frames of dualism, Islam linked with instability and violence, Islam as the main factor in democratization and Western liberal democracy as a normative model. None of the 2011 WP editorials framed Islam as homogeneous and antidemocratic.

4.2. STAGE TWO: FINDINGS

The second stage of content analysis studies whether the units coded as Neo-Orientalist followed Huntington's or Fukuyama's line of thought. The results are summarized in Table 3.

	25.01.11 – 14.02.11				30.06.13 – 06.07.13			
	The New York Times		The Washington Post		The New York Times		The Washington Post	
	News	Editorials	News	Editorials	News	Editorials	News	Editorials
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Huntington	8	33	5	26	3	33	4	22
2. Fukuyama	16	66	14	74	6	67	14	78
Total	24	100	19	100	9	100	18	100

Table 3: Frames supporting Fukuyama and Huntington

As Table 3 shows, in 2011, more units adhered to Fukuyama's ideas than to Huntington's thesis, whereas in 2013, the results reversed. In 2011, 66% of news articles and 74% of editorials published in the NYT supported Fukuyama's vision, while only 33% of news articles and 26% of

editorials followed Huntington's ideas. By contrast, in 2013, 73% of news articles and 100% of editorials stuck to Huntington's ideas, and 27% of news articles and none of the editorials supported Fukuyama's vision.

The WP's news articles and editorials show a similar tendency. If in 2011, 66% of news articles and 78% of editorials supported Fukuyama's thesis and only 33% of news articles and 22% of editorials supported Huntington's view, in 2013, the trend reversed, and all Neo-Orientalist articles and editorials adhered to Huntington's vision.

4.3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

As noted above, both the NYT's and the WP's coverage of the 2011 and 2013 Egyptian uprisings included all five frames, concurring with the Neo-Orientalist assumptions summarized in Chapter 2. Section 4.3.1 describes how the news articles and editorials constructed the five Neo-Orientalist frames, and section 4.3.2 discusses how the Neo-Orientalist units inclined towards Huntington's or Fukuyama's ideas.

4.3.1 Stage One: Neo-Orientalist Frames

The units containing the dualism frame present Egyptians, Muslims, or Islamists as "Others" that should be educated or controlled, thus reaffirming the old colonialist discourse. Disregarding political and economic processes and imperialist legacy, these articles relate Egypt's problems with dualism. They contrast developed Western societies with the underdeveloped, unready Egyptians, or the "Arab Street" (Landler, Cooper, and Kirkpatrick 2011). Indeed, these articles falsely unify each side and attribute this contrast to the all-encompassing character distinguishing Islam from the Western pluralist culture.

This frame is constructed in several ways. Some units emphasize the lack of political culture in the Middle East, noting how Egyptians are "behind" (Friedman 2011). For this reason, they state, the Western-taught, internet-savvy young people focus on economic problems before "educating" Egyptians about the benefits of democracy (Kirkpatrick and Sanger 2011, Kirkpatrick 2011). Many articles consider such education necessary to "[build] the foundations of freedom" (Heydemann et al. 2011) and facilitate the emergence of a "democratic culture" (Dunne 2011). One editorial argues that unlike Americans, young Egyptians face constant conflict between the tribal and religious pressure on one hand and the "lures of the West - the material comforts, the education, the movies and music, the online connections and, even, the

individual freedom,” on the other (Wasserman 2011). Another one claims that in societies with “no tradition of tolerance or respect for minority rights,” democracy cannot flourish (Cohen 2011). “We are not them,” the author argues (Cohen 2011). Following similar logic, one article questions the US’ ability to democratize “societies in the Arab region that are the opposite of its own” (Dunne 2011). Another emphasizes “deep divides” between “Western-style constitutional democracy” and Islam’s role “in public life” (Kirkpatrick 2011). Islam’s resistance, many articles imply, keeps the “Western” ideas alien to the “Muslim consciousness” and for this reason, “looking for parallels between the West and Islam ... has always been a politically sad endeavor” (Gerecht 2011).

To contrast Muslims and Islamists with liberal democrats, one editorial stresses how a “Western-oriented” protester was “rightly suspicious of the Brotherhood” (Krauthammer 2011). Some units use stereotypical representations of Muslim men. For example, one editorial emphasizes the unease among liberal, pro-democracy, and pro-freedom protesters about Islamists, “middle-aged men with beards [and] bruises on their foreheads from prayers” (Kirkpatrick 2011). To calm anxieties, the author argues, organizers put “a secular, liberal and familiar face on the opposition” (Kirkpatrick 2011). Another one hopes for the reconciliation between a “Westernized” Egyptian woman and a “bearded” Egyptian man (Cohen 2011).

The 2011 units are mostly optimistic, suggesting that Egypt still “has a reasonable shot at joining the *normal*, democratic world” (Brooks 2011, emphasis added). Using the word “normal” suggests the Neo-Orientalist assumption that liberal democratic countries represent the superior, teleological models for Egypt to follow. To achieve this, the 2011 units agree, Islamists should adjust their views to “build a secular modern state” and “advance civil culture” (Shadid 2011). Some believe that even though Islamists will never like “us,” secular liberal forces could still democratize Egypt (Dunne 2011). In 2013, however, the dualism frame contains more pessimistic overtones. Only one author acknowledges that “Much of the Western media has tended to describe the divide in Egypt as between secularists and Islamists, portraying ousted Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi as having pursued a radical Islamic agenda in his year in office” (Zakaria 2013). However, he also joins the trend; noting that this argument contains “a strand of truth” (Zakaria 2013), he stresses that the differences between Egypt and South Africa and between Mohammed Morsi and Nelson Mandela make Egypt less likely to follow South Africa’s democratization example. He does not mention the two countries’ political, economic,

or social circumstances, leaving the impression that, as Neo-Orientalists would assume, there is a fundamental difference between “Westernized” or non-Islamic and Islamic cultures. Along similar lines, another editorial even suggests that Islamists, who “are defined by” their values, “lack the mental equipment to govern” (Brooks 2013). Morsi’s failures to implement reforms, the argument goes, result from the “incompetence [that] is built into the intellectual DNA of radical Islam” (Brooks 2013). The author does not limit this incompetence to radicals or Islamists; with a Huntington-like argument, he hints that Egyptians in general are mentally underdeveloped and argues that as a result, they are unable to solve their problems: “It’s not that Egypt doesn’t have a recipe for a democratic transition. It seems to lack even the basic mental ingredients” (Brooks 2013). Likewise, another editorial emphasizes the “Arab failure to deliver the new mind-set” (Cohen 2013).

Many articles emphasize how the Islamists consider democracy as “anti-Islamic” (Booth and Birnbaum 2013). Some state that Morsi’s removal would finally alienate Islamists from democracy; for example, one article uncritically cites dualist opinions: “the message will resonate throughout the Muslim world loud and clear: democracy is not for Muslims” and “we [pro-Morsi demonstrators] don’t believe in democracy” (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013).

As mentioned above, Islam is assumed as the main reason behind such dualism. Indeed, in many articles, Islam is homogenized as anti-modern or anti-democratic. One editorial emphasizes how Islam in general needs to accommodate democracy (Dowd 2011), and another one states that the “Muslim world” shares “conspiracy theories about the Jews” (Halevi 2011). Accepting a Neo-Orientalist assumption, these articles overlook differences in different Muslim groups’ views. They misleadingly unify “Muslim Brotherhood *and* other extremists” on one hand (Atran 2011, emphasis added) versus “secularists *and* other democratic elements” on the other (Krauthammer 2011, emphasis added).

Some articles homogenize Islamists in general as fundamentalists (Whitlock 2011, Witte and Whitlock, 2011, Whitlock and Fadel 2011). Others express hope that Mubarak contributes to the possibility of a “real” democracy, instead of enabling Islamists to come to power (Heydemann et al. 2011). They consider Islamism, “the new totalitarianism” (Krauthammer 2011) as the reason behind such convergence of opinions and suggest that the Islamists “despise America ... for what it is,” (Cohen 2011) not for its actions.

As with the dualism frame, the assumption that Islam is homogeneous and antidemocratic becomes more pessimistic in 2013. For example, one author highlights how Islamists are “incapable of running a modern government” since they “have absolutist, apocalyptic mind-sets” (Brooks 2013), and another one stresses that Egypt failed an “important experiment in combining Islam with democratic modernity” (Cohen 2013). As pointed out in the introduction, Morsi made a number of governing mistakes during his rule; however, these articles never discuss Morsi’s mistakes. His ineffectiveness as a leader is attributed not to his actions, but solely to his religion, based on the Orientalist assumption that Islam and democracy are incompatible.

Assuming homogeneity, many articles imply that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, other Egyptian Islamists, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Muslims in Jordan and Iran necessarily share similar, anti-American, Anti-Israel, or anti-democratic views (Bronner 2011, Ignatius 2011, Krauthammer 2011). According to one editorial, “an Islamist Egypt could produce the ultimate Israeli nightmare” (Halevi 2011). Although Morsi never threatened Israel directly - in his first Presidential interview, he mentioned that he would respect the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty (Blomfield 2012) - these articles jump to the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement would increase instability, fuel terrorism, and threaten Israel. These predictions are based not on political or economic analysis, but on the Neo-Orientalist assumption of the inherently violent, illiberal nature of Islam. One editorial, sharing Huntington’s vision, notes the Islamist “fascination with a culture of death,” and characterizes Islam as “the main threat to global peace” (Brooks 2013).

Some articles relate the conflict between pro- and anti-Morsi demonstrators in 2013 to the “region’s perennial political conflict between secularism and Islam” (Cowell 2013). One refers to “Muslim Brotherhood and other extremists,” thus implying that the Brotherhood is also extremist (Atran 2011). Some editorials assume that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and “Muslim terrorists” (Ignatius 2011) also have the same goals: one points to the “Pan-Islamic” vision of Islamist groups (Cowell 2013), another quotes websites suggesting that the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist groups pursue Islamic revolution, regardless of their differences (Leland 2011), and still others underline the slogan “Islam is the solution,” overlooking the fact that in 2005, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood distanced itself from this vision (Shadid 2011).

Following this line of argument, some articles imply that an Islamist government in Egypt could disrupt the US “counterterrorism campaign” (Cooper, Landler and Mazzetti 2011), besieging

Israel and possibly causing a war (Bronner 2011). Many fear that the post-Mubarak “vacuum” (Sanger and Cooper 2011) would enable Islamists to “take over,” causing a “strategic disaster” for the region (Witte 2011, Dunne 2011). One article presents the fear of Islamist governments as common knowledge (Douthat 2011), and others argue that an Islamic state would be “fundamentalist” and “fanatical” (Applebaum 2011) or “racist, anti-Semitic and anti-Christian,” “[treating] women as the Taliban now does” (Cohen 2011). Further linking religion with instability and violence, some units stress the Egyptian origins of some Al Qaeda members (Atran 2011, Shadid 2011).

In most 2011 articles and editorials, the frames linking Islam with instability and violence are balanced out with hopes that secular, liberal groups would help Islam accommodate democratic values. Certainly, these articles remain Neo-Orientalist in their Fukuyama-like teleological view. However, in 2013, the trend reverses. Some articles, for example, uncritically quote sources that consider most Islamists as “basically terrorists” (Kirkpatrick 2013) or warn that Morsi’s resignation could “fuel more violent terrorism” (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013).

These articles largely overlook the fact that Morsi’s supporters were protesting the removal of the President elected just a year ago. Rarely emphasizing political grievances of Morsi’s supporters, they regard all demonstrators as a “crowd” of “angry” (Hubbard 2013), “bellicose” and “defiant” (Kirkpatrick and Fahim 2013) Islamists with “a militant past” (Londoño 2013), causing “backlash” and promising “martyrdom,” “bloodshed,” or “Islamist insurgency” (Hauslohner, Booth and al-Hourani 2013). They emphasize how Morsi’s Islamist supporters used the Al Qaeda flag (Booth and Birnbaum 2013) and participated in “military-styled exercises during their nighttime sit-ins” (Hauslohner, Booth and al-Hourani 2013).

Discussing violence and instability, these articles emphasize the religious aspect. Indeed, as one article emphasizes, “Islamists rallied under the black flag of jihad and cheered widely at calls for a ‘war council’ to roll back Mr.Morsi’s ouster” (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013). Another one warns that Islamists might become more powerful and radical after Morsi’s removal, or, in worse case, might lead to a “violent conflict” (Birnbaum 2013). One article cites Hilary Clinton’s fears that the Muslim Brotherhood might “hijack” the revolution (Sanger 2011). Some others later normalize this metaphor and use it without quotation marks (Diehl 2011, Masoud 2011, Landler and Cooper 2011, Sanger and Cooper 2011, Cohen 2013).

Further emphasizing religion's influence, some units attribute the success of democratization to Islam's ability to adapt to modernity and liberal democratic views (Dowd 2011). They compare Egypt not to countries with similar political experiences or economic systems, but to countries with the same religion. So the nature of Islam, not political or economic forces, is considered as the main determinant. Egypt's prospects, some units suggest, depend on whether the Brotherhood follows the example of Turkey, the "Middle East model" (Thomas 2011), abandons the "Al Qaeda narrative" (Kirkpatrick and Sanger 2011) and, liberalizing Islam, encourages democratization. Otherwise, they argue, Egypt risks following Iranian or Algerian examples.

These articles relate Egypt's problems to the "near-impossible dream for Middle East reformers" to integrate Islam with "democracy and vibrant economics" (Thomas 2011). Most articles imply that allowing Brotherhood's involvement would produce a "noisy democracy" (Sanger 2011). One points to the Islamist "hidden agenda," without specifying the meaning or giving any evidence of its anti-democratic character (Kirkpatrick 2011). Following similar logic, one article argues that the Brotherhood's religious affiliations would prevent a "triumph of democracy" (Heydemann et al. 2011), and others imply that democracy should be encouraged "when true democrats, not just the Muslim Brotherhood, are ready" (Dunne 2011). They suppose that the rise of Islamism would defeat "secularists *and* other democratic elements" (Krauthammer 2011, emphasis added); others agree, stressing the Islamist threat to democracy and the dangers of the Iranian example (Diehl 2011). None of these articles specify what makes Islam or Islamism incompatible with democracy.

Along similar lines, many 2013 articles attribute Morsi's failure to implement reforms to his religious vision; some note that Morsi "failed to transcend his roots in the Muslim Brotherhood" (Hubbard 2013), others argue that coming from "the most conservative flank of the most conservative organization," Morsi was "ill equipped" to solve Egypt's problems, and still others suggest that Morsi's main mistake was the inclusion of Islamists in the government (Kirkpatrick and Fahim 2013). Some claim that during the one year in power, the Muslim Brotherhood "rejected democracy as anti-Islamic" (Booth and Birnbaum 2013). Certainly, it can be argued that Morsi's unsuccessful governance (see Chapter 1) set many Egyptians against him and his ideology. Indeed, many might not have agreed with his Islamist views or his policies. However, the 2013 units tend to directly link bad governance to Morsi's religious views. His actions are not criticized in detail; rather, his bad governance is linked with Islam, overlooking the fact that,

as noted in Chapter 2, “there is no reason to assume that Islam is any more or less compatible with democracy and human rights than Christianity or Judaism, for example” (Gelvin 2012: 7).

With a more pessimistic tone, the 2013 articles stress that Morsi’s rule was a chance for Islamists to impose their religious rule and that with his removal, Egypt might follow the Algerian example (Hauslohner 2013, Hauslohner, Booth and al-Hourani 2013). The process of democratization, the articles imply, is impeded because secular liberals, who “deeply resent Islamist rule” (Hauslohner, Booth and al-Hourani 2013) are opposed not only by Morsi’s supporters, but also by other Islamists (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013). One editorial states that Islamists “reject pluralism, secular democracy, and, to some degree, modernity” and “are going to wind up subverting democracy,” so to ensure democratization, they should leave, “even if it takes a coup” (Brooks 2013). Another suggests that Islamists in power will always impose authoritarian rule (Cohen 2013). Again, evidences for these arguments or analysis of Morsi’s policies are absent.

Some of these articles imply that the Western liberal democracy is an inherently superior normative model that Egypt should follow. Many suggest that to “succeed,” (Zakaria 2013). Egyptians need to refuse Islamist rule. Following Fukuyama’s teleological line of thought that disregards local specificities and predicts a universal liberal democratic end, some units highlight Egyptian aspirations for the Western “way to rejuvenation” that Eastern Europe experienced in 1989 (Shadid 2011). Egyptians, one editorial states, have a “template” of a “normal country” (Brooks 2011) to follow. Furthermore, it is in the US’ interests, these articles note, to support secular forces and civil society (Gerson 2011). One editorial argues that “superpowers [are] supposed to tell client states what they should or should not do” (Wasserman 2011).

Most of these articles seem to accept the democratic peace thesis – the idea that shared values and norms prevent democracies from fighting each other – unquestionably (Rosato 2003:585). They imply the moral superiority of “Western” ideas (Dowd 2011) and the inherently peaceful and successful nature of liberal democratic systems (Dunne 2011, Wilson and Warrick 2011). One attributes the demand for democracy to the “innovation of human beings” (Wilson and Warrick 2011), and another one stresses the pride among Egyptians “as they watched [Egypt] do in the past eight days what countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America accomplished decades ago” (Witte 2011).

Like all other frames, in 2013, this frame becomes increasingly pessimistic. Most units imply unease at Morsi's election. One states that the Islamist president was "an obstacle" to the desirable type of democracy (Londoño 2013), and others suggest that elections are useful only as long as they bring liberal-minded people to power. Some articles attribute this concern to the US' or other "Western nations'" governments (Cowell 2013), but journalists do little to challenge this opinion. By contrast, some articles emphasize how Islamists generally have problems achieving the normative model's standards; many allude to Turkey as a possible exception, while others highlight how Tunisia had difficulties "over the secular practicalities of governing" (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013).

4.3.2. Stage Two: Huntington and Fukuyama

As Table 3 and the discussion above show, in 2011, most units adhere to Fukuyama's line of thought, and in 2013, the trend changes towards Huntington's ideas. In the onset of the Egyptian uprisings, most articles alluded to universal human values and desires. One article notes how the Egyptians rose up for dignity (Shadid 2011), and another one emphasizes that the quest for democracy is universal and "does not require a basis in Enlightenment philosophy" (Gerson 2011). Advancing an argument similar to Fukuyama, the 2011 units predict successful democratization. They suggest that the universal human values, supported by technological development and modernization, will lead to liberal democracy. Even though dualism is still assumed, these articles, like Fukuyama, suggest that Egyptians have potential; people are "learning," one article states, "[this] is a historic moment, and it is teaching the Arab world everything" (Shadid 2011). Likewise, another one notes: "the idea of democracy had become a potent force among Muslims" (Gerecht 2011).

These articles express hope in the new internet-savvy, Facebook- and Twitter-friendly generation (Kirkpatrick and Slackman 2011, Kirkpatrick and Sanger 2011, Friedman 2011). Some stress how the traditional slogan, "Islam is the solution," is replaced by "Tunisia is the solution" (Shadid 2011). By accommodating liberal values, they hope, the Arab world will join the "remarkable democratic wave" (Brooks 2011). Opposing Huntington's ideas that Islam will always resist democracy, most of the 2011 units imply that Egypt will follow the examples of the democratic societies, not illiberal states like Iran (Shadid 2011). As one article argues, "It is clear that the Arab region has already moved to a new era" (Shaikh 2011).

Because of such hopeful prospects, these articles also support US' promotion of democracy. Interestingly, according to Brownlee (2012), the US' position was the central reason why Mubarak's authoritarian rule persisted in Egypt for decades; behind the official democracy promotion discourse, he argues, the US has always been interested in furthering its foreign policy interests in the region, namely, the Arab-Israeli peace and friendly relations with oil-rich gulf countries (Brownlee 2012: 5). The abovementioned units, however, support the dominant democracy-promoting discourse; agreeing with Fukuyama that spreading democracy leads to peace, they list the many benefits of Egypt's democratization and encourage the US to support the Egyptian protesters (Diehl 2011, Heydemann et al. 2011, Kristof 2011, Gerson 2011).

With a positive tone, these articles highlight that the peaceful protests leave violent jihadis out (Leland 2011). Others refer to the "ecstatic moments of triumph in Tahrir" (Shadid 2011) and the "intoxicating" hope (Kristof 2011). One article lists the many labels the Egyptian uprising received: "Revolution of the Youth, of the People, of Anger, of Freedom, of the Hungry, and most poetically, the Revolution of Light" (Shadid 2011).

This positive tone reverses in 2013. Most units support Huntington's opinion that civilizations share no universal values. Resembling Huntington's arguments about Islam's intolerance (Huntington 1996: 185), they imply that Islam opposes democracy, and that Morsi's removal makes it impossible to convince Muslims in the benefits of democratic rule (Brooks 2013, Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013). In contrast to 2011, the 2013 units mostly exclude the chances of democratization (Kirkpatrick 2013). Unlike the 2011 uprisings that united the whole society, they argue, the 2013 uprisings "challenge the historic sense of nationhood" (Kirkpatrick 2013); as a result, they predict the disappearance of the previously active pro-democracy youth (Hubbard 2013).

These articles suggest that outside powers should refrain from intervening in Egyptian conflicts. Like Huntington, they warn that outside interference is fruitless and dangerous (Huntington 1996: 316). One article describes Egyptians' violent reactions to the US ambassador's comments, suggesting that the diplomat should have refrained from "speaking too bluntly" (Londoño 2013). Another one notes that the US has no real power on Egypt (Brooks 2013).

Finally, the 2013 articles emphasize more negative elements, apparently agreeing with Huntington that Islam has "bloody borders" (Huntington 1996: 254). One emphasizes how the

“activists who once chanted, ‘Peaceful, peaceful,’ now joke darkly about the inevitability of violence: “Peaceful is dead”” (Kirkpatrick 2013). Another one describes calls for violence from foreign “radical Islamists” (Booth and Birnbaum 2013). Some highlight Islamist “bloody street battles” (Kirkpatrick and Fahim 2013) and warn that Morsi’s removal could increase terrorist threats (Kirkpatrick and Hubbard 2013).

4.3.3. Concluding Remarks

As content analysis shows, all five Neo-Orientalist frames are present in the NYT’s and WP’s coverage of the Egyptian uprisings of 2011 and 2013. In 2011, these units incline towards Fukuyama’s line of thought, suggesting successful democratization in Egypt, whereas in 2013, the trend reverses and the units adopt a more Huntington-like position, excluding the chances of democratization.

These Neo-Orientalist frames can be linked with the wider social, political, and economic context. After the above presented quantitative analysis, following section offers qualitative critical discourse analysis.

CHAPTER FIVE: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

As noted in Chapter 3, this thesis conducts CDA according to Fairclough’s 3-level approach. The first level is description, which studies discourse as text, i.e. highlights textual practices in dominant frames identified during content analysis (section 5.1). The second level, interpretation, studies discourse as discursive practice, paying attention to the relationship between the text and its production (section 5.2). Finally, the third level, explanation, relates discourse to social practices (section 5.3).

5.1. DESCRIPTION: DISCOURSE AS TEXT

On the first level, the study of discourse as text discusses how frames are constructed by choosing names and metaphors, sourcing, presupposing, foregrounding and backgrounding. As content analysis shows, from the onset of the 2011 uprisings, the articles presuppose that the

Internet triggered the demonstrations. The demonstrators are labelled as “pro-democracy” and “pro-freedom,” and the organizers are referred to as the Facebook or Twitter generation. These articles overlook the fact that internet access in Egypt is still around 20%, and Facebook usage is 14% (Rich 2011, Miniwatts Marketing Group 2012). Only one NYT unit criticizes “the default assumption that the Egyptian uprising, like every other paroxysm in the region since the Green Revolution in Iran 18 months ago, must be powered by the twin American-born phenomena of Twitter and Facebook” (Rich 2011). The author rightfully notes that even if the social networks facilitated protest organization, they could not have caused the uprisings (Rich 2011). In addition to legitimizing protesters’ demands and implying support for their cause, such labelling reinforces Neo-Orientalist assumptions that the “underdeveloped” Egyptians are learning to use the “Western” techniques (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, peaceful ways of protest) and internalize “Western ideas” (democracy, freedom).

Homogenizing the organizers as modern internet-active youngsters separates them from the supposedly old-fashioned Muslim Brotherhood. Such distinction ignores the fact that many young members of the Brotherhood are similarly tech-savvy. In fact, as Lynch notes, young Brotherhood members “have more in common with other young Egyptian activists, whether leftist or nationalist, than they do with their less wired peers” (Lynch 2009: 1). Homogenization and distinction indicates bias against the Brotherhood and support for the non-Islamist groups.

Bias against the Brotherhood also becomes evident in 2011 articles that precede the title “Muslim Brotherhood” by adjectives such as “outlawed” or “banned” (for example, Kirkpatrick and Slackman 2011, Kirkpatrick 2011, Sanger 2011). The circumstances that led to this ban are rarely explained. As Pasha notes, the Brotherhood gained popularity in postcolonial Egypt, opposing the regime and creating “educational, economic, military and political infrastructure” (Pasha 2011: 82). The group and other opposition parties refused to participate in the 1990 elections due to “no minimum guarantee of free and fair elections” (Pasha 2011: 97). Mubarak’s extraordinary electoral success in 1995 (94% of Presidential votes and 90% of Parliamentary seats) strengthened the opposition’s argument (Pasha 2011: 97). The regime banned the Brotherhood, accusing it of cooperation with violent groups (Pasha 2011: 97). Interestingly, in 1992, the Egyptian Administrative Court ruled the ban as illegal (El-Errian 2011). Disregarding these details, the articles adopt Mubarak’s rhetoric, stating that the Brotherhood was banned “because of its Islamist ideology” (Kirkpatrick 2011) and implying that Islamist orientation can

be a sufficient reason to outlaw an organization. The bias against the Brotherhood and support for the demonstrators suggests hopes that the uprising will sideline the Brotherhood and bring secular liberals to power.

Foregrounding the ban, these Neo-Orientalist units overlook the Muslim Brotherhood's political stance and its dissimilarities with other Muslim or Islamist groups. In his opinion editorial contributed to NYT, Essam El-Errian, one of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders, stated:

“We disagree with the claims that the only options in Egypt are a purely secular, liberal democracy or an authoritarian theocracy. Secular liberal democracy of the American and European variety, with its firm rejection of religion in public life, is not the exclusive model for a legitimate democracy. In Egypt, religion continues to be an important part of our culture and heritage. Moving forward, we envision the establishment of a democratic, civil state that draws on universal measures of freedom and justice, which are central Islamic values. We embrace democracy not as a foreign concept that must be reconciled with tradition, but as a set of principles and objectives that are inherently compatible with and reinforce Islamic tenets” (El-Errian 2011).

Given El-Errian's position in the Brotherhood, it is reasonable to argue that his article might be politically biased. Nevertheless, the marginalization of such pro-democracy statements and the foregrounding of only anti-democracy comments from Islamists reinforce the Neo-Orientalist assumption that Islam and Islamism are incompatible with liberal democracy and imply support for non-Islamist opposition movements.

To underline Islam's incompatibility with democracy, some articles (for example, Booth and Birnbaum 2013), overlook the distinctions in the Brotherhood's and violent groups' goals and quote anti-democratic Islamists or extremist websites calling for global jihad. Even though all units mention the Muslim Brotherhood in one way or another, hardly any articles (0.08%, or 17 out of 209) quote the group's members. From the few articles citing the Muslim Brotherhood, one mentions a member's pro-democracy stance, but accompanies the quote by the journalist's assessment that democracy poses a challenge for conservative Islam (Shadid 2011). Another one quotes Morsi's supporters, but inserts quotation marks, implying reluctance to agree (“Islamist

allies vowed to ... stop “what they called ‘a military coup,’” “called on the crowd to defend Mr. Morsi’s ‘legitimacy’ as the elected president” (Kirkpatrick and Fahim 2013)).

By contrast, the journalists rarely question the opinion of the “experts,” political scientists from the US or Israeli universities (predominantly the Georgetown University, Kent State University, and Fordham University in the US, and Tel Aviv University and Haifa University in Israel), as well as the US officials and policymakers, who reinforce the Neo-Orientalist discourse. For example, Giora Eiland, a Tel-Aviv University fellow, notes that an Islamist government in Egypt might go to war with Israel, assuming that the Egyptian Brotherhood and other Islamists or Muslims in the region have similar, anti-Israeli aims (Bronner 2011). Eiland’s opinions go unchallenged by the journalist. In fact, Bronner also notes that the Brotherhood is “hostile to Israel and close to Hamas” (Bronner 2011).

Anti-Brotherhood bias is also evident from the US officials’ comments which are likewise uncritically quoted. For instance, Whitlock notes how “some U.S. officials ... have argued that the White House should embrace opposition groups who are more likely to support a democratic government in Egypt, rather than one dedicated to the establishment of religious law” (Whitlock 2011). Kristof stresses US officials’ fears that “if elections come to soon, before secular groups can organize, the Brotherhood will do well” and notes that this is a “legitimate concern” (Kristof 2011).

In addition to University experts or US officials, some articles (16% or 34 of 209) quote unnamed “analysts,” again without critique. For instance, Kershner writes: “If the Muslim Brotherhood indeed gains power in Egypt, analysts say, it may only be a matter of time before Hamas takes over the West bank” (Kershner 2011). Such unchallenged citations suggest the journalists’ agreement with these sources. Hence, sourcing also contributes to the Neo-Orientalist discourse.

In 2013, the articles implicitly support the demonstrations calling for Morsi’s resignation. Again emphasizing Islam’s incompatibility with liberal democracy, these units relate Morsi’s failure with his religious views. Disapproving Morsi for the so-called “Brotherhoodization” of the state is certainly a valid criticism. In fact, many Egyptians also perceived his governing style as undemocratic; as noted in Chapter 1, Morsi sought to increase the Brotherhood’s influence in the government by appointing fellow members in governorships and the Shura council. He also

pursued control over state media and tried to increase executive power (Al-Awadi 2013: 546). Hence, Morsi's policies can be considered undemocratic, but the reason is his refusal to engage the opposition and his strive for excessive power, not Islam's inherent incompatibility with democracy. As content analysis shows, however, the NYT and WP articles merely stress the religious factor. As Zakaria notes, "[much] of the Western media has tended to describe the divide in Egypt as between secularists and Islamists, Portraying ousted Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi as having pursued a radical Islamic agenda in his year in office," even though "the story is more about grabbing power than enacting sharia" (Zakaria 2013).

Further emphasizing Islam's incompatibility with democracy, the 2013 articles presume that disbelief in democracy is common among Pro-Morsi demonstrators. Indeed, when Morsi's supporters oppose the resignation demand, the articles homogenize these demonstrators under the labels of "Pro-Morsi" "angry Islamists." One title even notes that the protests threaten the "Muslim Brotherhood and *Its* Leader" (Kirkpatrick and Fahim 2011, emphasis added), thus foregrounding that Morsi is one of the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders and backgrounding that he is the legitimately elected President of Egypt. It is worth noting that anti-Morsi demonstrations were supported by the Islamic Al-Nour party, different civil society groups, Al-Azhar University, the Coptic Church, Muhammad El Baradei's National Salvation Front, and members the security services and the military (Aly and Feldman 2014: 2). Hence, a large portion of the Egyptian population might have felt that Morsi was no longer their representative leader and rather, advanced only the interests of a particular group and imposed an undemocratic rule. However, the abovementioned labels reflect these sentiments uncritically, overlooking the fact that Morsi was still a popularly elected President. The naming choices, therefore, delegitimize the position of Morsi and the people opposing the resignation demand. The articles support the anti-government protests also after Morsi's removal from presidency; they emphasize how Morsi's supporters refer to the event as a "coup;" but the use of quotation marks belays the journalists' skepticism towards this opinion (e.g. in Kirkpatrick and Fahim 2013, Shear 2013, Hauslohner 2013, Booth and Birnbaum 2013).

Similar Neo-Orientalist assumptions seem to underlie the choices of metaphors. For example, as shown in content analysis, some articles refer to the Egyptian public opinion as the "Arab street." In a NYT article, Cooper et al. ask: "Will the shifts in the region benefit Islamic extremists, who will try to capitalize on unrest, or will it show the Arab street the power of a secular uprising?"

(Cooper, Landler and Mazzetti 2011). In another article, Cooper et al. note: “[the] story of how Mr. Mubarak, an Arab autocrat ... suddenly found himself pushed toward the exit is first and foremost a tale of the Arab street” (Cooper, Landler and Kirkpatrick 2011). According to Regier and Khalidi, this metaphor implies the irrationality and volatility of Egyptian public opinion and “[invites] the inference that the Arab public is fundamentally unlike others” (Regier and Khalidi 2009:27).

Another popular metaphor is “hijacking.” A NYT article cites Hilary Clinton’s fears that the Muslim Brotherhood might “hijack” the revolution (Sanger 2011). Others (e.g. Masoud 2011, Landler and Cooper 2011, Diehl 2011, Sanger and Cooper 2011, Cohen 2013) normalize this metaphor, often associated with terrorism and the 9/11 attack (Montgomery 2005: 158), by using it without quotation marks. To illustrate, Landler and Cooper note that the Brotherhood “has begun to hijack the protests that began among largely secular young people in Egypt adept at using Facebook and Twitter” (Landler and Cooper 2011). Thus, this metaphor hints at the Neo-Orientalist assumption of Islam’s inherent violence; the brotherhood is implicitly associated with violent Islam and terrorism, and is juxtaposed to secular, internet-savvy, pro-democracy youngsters.

Finally, the 2011 uprisings are often referred to as the “Arab Spring.” Like others, this metaphor is also naturalized, used without quotation marks. It foregrounds the Egyptians’ aspiration to liberal ideals, but backgrounds their social and economic grievances (Makale 2013: 17). Yet, the Egyptians expressed not only their desire for political participation, but also their discontent with post-colonial authoritarianism and harsh Neoliberal economic policies that cut government spending and increased social inequalities (Makale 2013:18). These grievances have been fuelling years-long labor protest movements. The “spring” metaphor disregards the protest history and implies awakening from winters’ sleep (Makale 2013: 18). In addition, this metaphor evokes associations of the so-called Prague Spring in 1989 and the Damascus Spring in 2000; both were temporary political transformations, the former halted by the Soviet Union and the latter by the Syrian government (Khoury 2011, Carnegie Syria Resources 2012). Thus, the metaphor implies temporariness. Finally, according to Khouri, the metaphor belittles the bravery of the Egyptians and other Middle Easterners to rise up against state brutality; spring “just happens” to “helpless people who have no power and say in the process,” whereas revolutions or uprisings occur through powerful, determined citizens motivated for change (Khoury 2011). As

Khouri notes, this metaphor implies unease about the Arabs determining their own future: “softer Arabs who sway with seasons” are less troubling than “revolutionary, self-assertive Arabs” who might not want to shape their future in line with Western interests (Khouri 2011). Indeed, when Egypt deviated from the expected “democracy wave” path (similar to the Eastern Europe, for example), one article suggested that the “chill of an Arab Winter” had followed the spring hopefulness (Byman 2011), and the NYT created a special section titled “Arab Spring, Fall, and After” with details of protests that “turned violent” (2012).

With a Neo-Orientalist emphasis on Islam’s nature, these units disregard the political and economic forces affecting Egypt’s democratization. They largely ignore the impact of colonialism and imperialism. Some editorials, for example, emphasize how Iran’s popular movement produced a repressive religious autocracy, whereas the Eastern European uprisings led to stable democracies (Kristof 2011, Brooks 2013). For example, Kristof notes: “In 1979, a grass-roots uprising in Iran led to an undemocratic regime that oppresses women and minorities and destabilizes the region. In 1989, uprisings in Eastern Europe led to the rise of stable democracies. So if Egyptian protesters overcome the government, would this be 1979 or 1989?” (Kristof 2011). The author implicitly shares the fears that free elections might bring Islamists to power; however, he considers the Brotherhood unlikely to win elections and thus expects democratization: “my hunch is that they would lose support if they actually tried to administer anything” (Kristof 2011). Iran’s failure, as well as Egypt’s problems, is related with religion, either implicitly, as in Kristof’s editorial, or explicitly, as in Brook’s statement about Islam’s inherent incapability: “We’ve seen that in Algeria, Iran, Palestine and Egypt: real-world practical ineptitude that leads to the implosion of the governing apparatus” (Brooks 2013). Such prejudiced thinking leads to a Neo-Orientalist conclusion that Egypt’s problems can be attributed to dualism and that Egyptians require guidance or control in order to achieve stability.

5.2. INTERPRETATION: DISCOURSE AS DISCURSIVE PRACTICE

This section relates the abovementioned textual practices to discursive practices, examining the relationship between the text and its production. As content analysis shows, the coverage of the uprisings in 2011 largely followed Fukuyama’s line of thought. As one of the leading protesters, Mohamed El Baradei, “[eased] concerns about Islamists by putting a secular, liberal and familiar face on the opposition” (Kirkpatrick and Slackman 2011), the units legitimized protesters’ demands for Mubarak’s resignation and for freedom and democracy in general, emphasized

universal human desires, and predicted successful democratization. In 2013, however, the trend reversed, and the units anticipated increasing unrest. Such discourse seems to align with the US foreign policy priorities.

As Gerges (2013) explains, during the uprisings, one of Obama's main concerns was the perceived regional security threat towards Israel (Gerges 2013: 192). Indeed, many units point out that Israel is the only democratic country in the region and emphasize the US' and Israel's parallel interests (e.g. Wilson 2011, Baker 2013, Gordis 2011, Landler and Rudoren 2013). For example, Wilson notes how "[the] increasing political volatility in the region has large implications for U.S. security interests" and emphasizes that Mubarak's repressive authoritarianism promised a certain degree of stability, "at least a tepid partnership" with Israel (Wilson 2011). Baker notes "[the] overriding American interest in Egypt is preserving its three-decade peace with Israel, which officials believe the military is committed to doing" (Baker 2013). Quoting "officials and analysts," Baker suggests: "[Egypt's] 'peace with Israel is the cornerstone of security for the Jewish state and any future resolution of the conflict with Palestinians. American military deployments to the east depend on the Suez Canal. And Egyptian intelligence has been crucial in the hunt for terrorists'" (Baker 2013).

Indeed, Israel is one of the US' closest allies; since World War II, Israel has received the largest foreign aid from the United States, amounting to \$140 billion as of 2003 (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006: 31). In addition to aid, the country receives special treatment: Israel gets assistance on a yearly, not quarterly, basis, is not obliged to report on how the money is spent, has access to US intelligence, and benefits from unswerving diplomatic support (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006: 31). As Mearsheimer and Walt argue, such support is extraordinary for several reasons. Firstly, Israel is not a strategic asset. The US' problems in the Middle East, including terrorism and the so-called "rogue states" largely stem from its support to Israel: these problems "are not a dire threat to vital U.S. interests, apart from the U.S. commitment to Israel itself" (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006: 33). Secondly, Israeli actions can hardly be morally justified. With its strong military, Israel is far from being a helpless "David" needing US defense from the "Arab Goliath" (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006: 34). Its questionable foreign policies weaken the argument in favor of supporting a "fellow democracy" (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006: 35). Moreover, while past crimes against Jews may morally justify Israel's existence, they cannot account for crimes against the Palestinians (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006: 37).

The US' support for Israel, Mearsheimer and Walt argue, results from the powerful Israeli lobby, which operates on different levels (including the Congress, the executive branch, academia, think tanks, and the media) to reinforce a positive image of Israel. For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note how, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, mainstream US newspaper editorials, including the NYT and the WP, show pro-Israeli prejudice (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006: 45). By contrast, Pro-Arab lobby groups are considerably powerless, further strengthening the position of Pro-Israeli lobbyists (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006: 42).

Indeed, pro-Israeli prejudice is evident in numerous units (e.g. Gordis 2011, Halevi 2011, Meridor 2011, Cohen 2011). Daniel Gordis, for example, argues: "you can understand why many Israelis feel surrounded" by the situation in Egypt; "[Israel's] most important regional ally faces possible chaos and an Islamist takeover. Add to this King Abdullah II's recent dismissal of his cabinet in Jordan (the only other Arab country that has signed a peace treaty with Israel), Hezbollah's quiet coup in Lebanon last month, a resurgent Syria and an increasingly Islamist Turkey" (Gordis 2011). In the same article, he ignores the illegality of Israeli settlements and notes that while the US condemns the settlement construction, it never exercises similar pressure on Palestinians (Gordis 2011). The chaos in Egypt, he concludes, emphasizes that Israel is the US' only democratic ally in the region, so the US should be more assertive towards Palestinians.

Yossi Klein Halevi's article, "Israel, alone again?" is another example. Halevi discusses the Israeli fears of Islamists, but rarely criticizes them. He describes how "Israel remains David" in its relations with Arabs and Muslims, and refers to Israel's regional wars as "asymmetrical confrontations against terrorists" (Halevi 2011). Egyptian Islamists, he notes, upset Israelis because "The Brotherhood and its offshoots have been the main purveyors of the Muslim world's widespread conspiracy theories about the Jews" (Halevi 2011). Implicitly agreeing, he states that the hopes about the Brotherhood's moderation are "dismissed as Western naïveté: the same prediction, after all, was made about the Iranian regime, Hezbollah and Hamas" (Halevi 2011). Homogenization of Israel's neighbors as terrorist Muslims accepting conspiracy theories points to the author's pro-Israeli bias.

Similar fears are emphasized in Sallai Meridor's article. The author explains that Israeli reluctance to support Egyptian demonstrations stems from the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is "not truly committed to freedom and peace" and "deeply hostile to Israel, America and the

West” (Meridor 2011). As many other Neo-Orientalist units, this article also ascribes the anti-democratic, anti-Israeli, and anti-Western sentiment to Islamists.

Likewise, Richard Cohen predicts unsuccessful democratization. He argues that before becoming a real democracy, Egypt will have to go through similar stages as Eastern and Central Europe. (Cohen 2011). Cohen thus follows a Fukuyama-like Orientalist argument that all states are transitioning to their teleological end – liberal democracy – and disregards particular political, social, economic, etc. circumstances influencing democratization. Before the transition, he fears, Egypt will have to endure an anti-Israel, radical Islamist rule (Cohen 2011). Certainly, the Muslim Brotherhood has previously uttered anti-Zionist statements; for his 2010 interviews, where he referred to the Zionists as “descendants of apes and pigs,” Morsi was blamed for encouraging religious hatred (BBC 2013). However, in his first interview as a President, he promised to abide by the peace treaty with Israel (Blomfield 2012). Regardless of these details, the Neo-Orientalist units unquestionably assume that the Brotherhood opposes democracy, Israel, and the West in general.

Interestingly, the abovementioned authors are associated with Israel in one way or another. For example, Daniel Gordis, an opinion-editorial contributor for the NYT and the *Jerusalem Post*, is the Vice President and a Distinguished Fellow at Shalem College in Jerusalem. He has been characterized as a person “who cares the most about the physical, moral and spiritual health of Israel” (About Daniel Gordis 2014). Yossi Klein Halevi, an editorial contributor to the NYT, the *Wall Street Journal*, and *Foreign Affairs*, is a Senior Fellow at the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem (Barnes and Noble 2014). Sallai Meridor, a WP editorial contributor, was a Chair of the Jewish Agency for Israel and the World Zionist Organization, as well as the Israeli Ambassador to the United States (The Harry Walker Agency 2014). And Richard Cohen, a WP columnist, has been noticed as “attached to Israel” (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). These authors’ affiliation with Israel seems to support Mearsheimer and Walt’s argument about the US media’s pro-Israeli bias.

Pro-Israeli bias is not the only example of convergence between the Neo-Orientalist units and the US administration’s position. The articles also reflected the government’s attitude toward protesters. Certainly, the Obama administration was initially reluctant to break with Mubarak, a long-standing ally. As Hanieh notes, however, as protests continued, the US’ position shifted from supporting Mubarak to calling for “orderly transitions” to democracy (Hanieh 2011:8). The

dominant narrative now focused solely on the Egyptian struggle for democracy and freedom and disregarded the underlying interlinked political and economic grievances and the broader context: the development of Capitalism and economic Neoliberalism and “Egypt’s role in sustaining patterns of US domination” in MENA (Hanieh 2011: 9). So in 2011, the Obama administration, despite initial reluctance, largely supported the anti-Mubarak protests, whereas in 2013, it alienated Morsi (Ambinder 2011). Along the same lines, the NYT and WP articles used textual practices to support the 2011 Anti-Mubarak protesters, whereas in 2013, they delegitimized Morsi’s backers. This convergence was especially evident in the reluctance to call Morsi’s military ouster a “coup.” Accepting such definition would require cutting off the \$155 billion military aid to Egypt, since according to Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act: “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree” (Feldman 2013). However, the Obama administration was cautious to take such drastic measures. The NYT and WP coverage of the Egyptian uprisings apparently aligned with the administration’s foreign policy considerations. Such government-media concurrence is hardly new; indeed, as many scholars have argued, the US media has supported the official US position on a number of occasions (Bennett 1994, Herring and Robinson 2003, Soroka 2003, Zaller and Chiu 1996, Dorman and Farhang 1988).

5.3. EXPLANATION: DISCOURSE AS SOCIAL PRACTICE

This section relates the textual and discursive levels to the social practice level. As noted above, the NYT and WP discourse around the Egyptian uprisings largely correspond to the US’ foreign policy priorities. These priorities can be further studied by relating discourse to the social context, namely, to two social practices: first, the general US policy of promoting liberal democracy as a universal model, and second, the US’ foreign policy interests in Egypt.

According to Lawson, “Western powers,” mostly the US, have been accused of the Universalist promotion of liberal democracy as a normative model. The Universalist approach sees morality as intercultural and believes that international relations can abide by unanimously established norms. (Lawson 2008: 253). For many, the “moralistic rhetoric and posturing,” as well as “aid conditionality, structural adjustment policies, favorable (or unfavorable) trade regimes” that force Muslim societies, among others, to adopt the “Western” interpretation of democracy, demonstrate the “[Western] arrogance, hubris, intolerance, neo-imperialism and cultural

chauvinism” (Lawson 2008: 264-265). This is not to say that the dominant culture has only been imposed only by the “West” onto the “Rest;” as noted earlier, the concepts of the “West” and the “non-West” are misleadingly homogenizing (Lawson 2008: 269). In addition, the alternative to universalism is not cultural relativism. Indeed, Lawson clarifies, cultural relativism can be as undemocratic as universalism (Lawson 2008: 263). While universalism acknowledges a single dogmatic model and discourages diversity, relativism advocates an infinite variety of interpretations and thus may conceal authoritarianism; some states, for instance, have exercised “internal colonialism,” repressing undesirable groups in the name of relativism (Lawson 2008: 269).

In any case, as Lawson explains, most contemporary discussions about the impact of culture on democracy reflect the power and ideology relations. The dominant cultures indeed advocate a certain interpretation of democracy as a universal model. This tendency is reflected in the shift from Fukuyama-style rhetoric to Huntingtonian logic in the Neo-Orientalist units. If in 2011, the teleological view was emphasized, in 2013, as Egypt deviated from the expected path, most units alluded to a clash of civilizations.

Apart from the general Universalist policy, the papers also seem to concur with the US’ policy towards Egypt. According to Spector (2005), Egypt has long sought regional leadership. The 1978 Camp David Accords, as well as the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, made the country one of the crucial US allies in the Middle East. Indeed, Egypt is the second-largest receiver of the US foreign aid; since 1979, the aid has amounted to roughly 50 billion dollars (Spector 2005:3). Mubarak exploited Egypt’s regional importance: he manipulated with the US fears of Islamism and presented himself as the only alternative to totalitarian and anti-modern Islamist regimes. Thereby, he resisted the pressure for internal reform (Gerges 2013: 190).

Nonetheless, Spector explains, Egypt’s dominant position has recently been challenged. Firstly, the US has increasing relations with Turkey, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, so Egypt is “no longer an indispensable strategic ally” (Spector 2005: 4). Moreover, Egypt’s attempts to mediate regional conflict among Arab and Muslim countries invited perceptions of Pan-Arabism and further alienated the US (Spector 2005: 6). In addition, Egypt’s deteriorating economy has done little to support its political ambitions (Spector 2005: 7). As a result, in 2011, the US relied less on Mubarak and had more power to push internal reforms in Egypt. Indeed, as Spector argues, back in 2001, George Bush had already acknowledged that the

risks of alienating Egyptian public “outweighed the benefits of nurturing friendly dictatorships” (Spector 2005: 8). However, as Ambinder (2011) explains, Bush failed to decrease the anti-American sentiment and followed a rigid, democracy-pushing policy in the Middle East. By contrast, Ambinder (2011) notes, President Obama and his advisors favor less intrusive, “hidden-hand diplomacy,” or “the art ... of nudging allies or adversaries in the desired direction, rather than trying to command them to act” (Ambinder 2011). Certainly, spreading liberal democracy worldwide is in the US’ interests; however, Ambinder explains, Obama tries to emphasize the universality of democratic values instead of stressing their American character. As noted earlier, despite initial reluctance to break a longstanding partnership, Obama shifted the narrative and supporting the 2011 demonstrators, gradually urged Mubarak to step down (Ambinder 2011). Likewise, the units became increasingly critical of Mubarak’s regime and expressed increasing support for the demonstrators.

Housden (2013) explains that the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral success after Mubarak’s resignation resulted from its promise to address economic problems. By contrast, instead of focusing on unemployment and income inequality, the liberal opposition groups advocated abstract notions of liberalism, democracy, and freedom. Such ideas might have been attractive for the upper class, but not for the Egyptian majority, the low-income workers (Housden 2013: 75). Given the public support for the Muslim Brotherhood, the US administration was forced to engage with Islamists. To the US’ surprise, Gerges notes, the Brotherhood demonstrated willingness to play with the political rules (Gerges 2013: 192). As a result, the US administration also molded its anti-Brotherhood stance (Gerges 2013: 190). Similarly, if the newspapers initially expected the Brotherhood to refrain from joining the demonstrators, they gradually moved to hopes that the secular liberals would moderate the group and encourage its participation in the political process.

As noted in the introduction, the Brotherhood lacked governing experience and Morsi made a number of mistakes during his presidency. Yet, these mistakes were overshadowed by perceived “Brotherhoodization” of the government (Housden 2013: 73). In fact, Morsi was nominated only after the Brotherhood’s first candidate, Khairat El-Shater, got disqualified from elections, earning Morsi the nickname “spare tire” in Egypt (Housden 2013: 73, Al-Awadi 2013: 545). In addition, Morsi won over a narrow, 51.7% margin over his opponent, Ahmed Shafiq, the last Prime Minister under Mubarak (Al-Awadi 2013: 545). On top of such weak initial position,

Morsi broke his promise of involving other opposition groups and tried to increase control over the Shura Council, the Upper House of the Egyptian Parliament, by appointing fellow Brotherhood members (Housden 2013:73). In addition, Morsi appointed Islamists in half of Egypt's governorships, which many perceived as an attempt appease religious conservative groups (Housden 2013: 74). Furthermore, Morsi increased the power of the Al-Azhar University - the "centre of Islamic debate in the Middle East," by allowing it to oversee constitutional reforms (Housden 2013: 74). These actions and the failure to implement successful reforms renewed old fears of Brotherhood's Islamist agenda. Indeed, for the last decades, and increasingly after the 9/11, the US feared that Islamists' rise to power would guarantee illiberal policies and increase tensions with Israel (Gerges 2013: 190). As a result, in 2013, the Obama administration was less supportive of Morsi and seemed more sympathetic to the anti-government protesters. This position was echoed in the reluctance to call Morsi's military ouster a "coup." As noted above, this tendency was reflected in the newspapers as well.

Hence, the Neo-Orientalist units reinforce the official US discourse, including both general foreign policy priorities and the specifically Egypt-related visions. Thereby, these units comply with the ideological square: they tend to emphasize the perceived dualism between the superior and inherently peaceful "Western" liberal democracies in contrast with the inferior and intrinsically violent Islam, and deemphasize the US' support for authoritarian allies or its backing of neoliberal reforms, together with the Muslim Brotherhood's willingness to participate in democratic political processes.

Discussing the NYT and WP coverage of the Egyptian uprisings reveals taken-for-granted, relatively obscure power relations. As the previous sections have shown, language not only reflects dominance, but also naturalizes it through different textual and discursive strategies. CDA also revealed inconsistencies between the stated values of both newspapers ("objectivity" or "impartiality") and their apparent Neo-Orientalist bias.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to examine whether the US media coverage of the Egyptian uprisings was relatively value-neutral, trying to accurately represent local grievances, or had a Neo-Orientalist orientation, reflecting underlying ideological positions. A combination of quantitative (content

analysis) and qualitative (critical discourse analysis) research demonstrates that news articles and editorials about the 2011 and 2013 uprisings from two major newspapers, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, include Neo-Orientalist frames. These articles consider liberal democracy as a universal normative model and contrast it with Islam, portrayed as a fundamentally different, homogeneous and antidemocratic phenomenon linked with instability and violence and singlehandedly influencing democratization process. Compared to 2011, Neo-Orientalist frames become more frequent in 2013; importantly, if in 2011, most units adhere to Fukuyama's view that Egypt would join the teleological march to liberal democracy, in 2013, the trend reverses and most units, like Huntington, exclude any possibility of democratization. The textual practices of naming, sourcing, presupposition, fore- and backgrounding, used to construct Neo-Orientalist frames, can be related to discursive practices, or the production of text, and larger social practices. As critical discourse analysis shows, the units show pro-Israeli bias and align with the US foreign policy priorities: both the general policy of liberal democracy promotion and the specific strategic interests in Egypt.

The thesis focuses on two newspapers and two major events in Egypt; therefore, these results cannot be directly generalized to other cases. Still, in addition to contributing another case study to the abovementioned literature on the topic, this thesis can lay foundations for future research. Further research could examine whether the US media framing corresponds to US foreign policy in the case of other MENA uprisings as well, since some of the MENA countries share similar colonial and post-colonial history as Egypt. Alternatively, the US media framing of the Egyptian uprisings can be compared to worldwide news media coverage to see if other newspapers also align with the respective countries' foreign policy priorities.

This thesis is also a useful basis for future studies since it combines quantitative and qualitative research. A combination of both methods proves useful, allowing for larger samples and more verifiability on the one hand, and for more in-depth analysis on the other hand.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Samiei and Sadowski noted the Neo-Orientalist bias among scholars; however, this thesis shows that the bias is not limited to academia. Importantly, the bias is present not only in editorials that reflect personal or board's opinions, but also in news articles that are supposedly impartial. The findings seem to confirm Tuastad's assertion that Neo-Orientalist perspectives are universalized in the US (Tuastad 2003: 594).

The thesis draws similar conclusions as other studies criticizing the US media (and specifically, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*) for bias and reinforcement of dominant discourse (Abrahamian 2003, Ashley and Olson 1998, Dunsky 2007, Evans 2010, Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, Peteet 2005, Regier and Khalidi 2009, Wittebols 2006). Importantly, it confirms the CDA assumption that elite media maintain dominant narratives; the findings show that this assumption holds true in the case of US media coverage of Egyptian uprisings. CDA maintains that over time, the value-laden language that powerful elites use to reinforce dominance becomes naturalized and widely adopted. As the poststructuralist theory would also suggest, the language thus becomes powerful in itself, regardless of the communicators' intentions. Indeed, discussing the NYT and WP coverage of the Egyptian uprisings reveals taken-for-granted, relatively obscure power relations and inconsistencies between the stated values of both newspapers ("objectivity" or "impartiality") and their apparent Neo-Orientalist bias. Revealing the underlying biases challenges the power elites that allow, preserve, or discount injustice and inequality and can serve as the first step to address these problems.

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NEUENDORF'S CONTENT ANALYSIS FLOWCHART

Box 3.1 A Flowchart for the Typical Process of Content Analysis Research

1. *Theory and rationale:* What content will be examined, and *why*? Are there certain *theories* or perspectives that indicate that this particular message content is important to study? Library work is needed here to conduct a good literature review. Will you be using an integrative model, linking content analysis with other data to show relationships with source or receiver characteristics? Do you have *research questions*? *Hypotheses*?

2. *Conceptualizations:* What *variables* will be used in the study, and how do you define them *conceptually* (i.e., with dictionary-type definitions)? Remember, you are the boss! There are many ways to define a given construct, and there is no one right way. You may want to screen some examples of the content you're going to analyze, to make sure you've covered everything you want.

3. *Operationalizations (measures):* Your measures should match your conceptualizations (this is called *internal validity*). What *units of data collection* will you use? You may have more than one unit (e.g., a by-utterance coding scheme and a by-speaker coding scheme). Are the variables measured well (i.e., at a high *level of measurement*, with categories that are *exhaustive and mutually exclusive*)? An *a priori* coding scheme describing all measures must be created. Both face validity and content validity may also be assessed at this point.

Human
Coding

Computer
Coding

4a. *Coding schemes:* You need to create the following materials:

- a. *Codebook* (with all variable measures *fully explained*)
- b. *Coding forms*

4b. *Coding schemes:* With computer text content analysis, you still need a codebook of sorts—a full explanation of your *dictionary* and method of applying them. You may use standard dictionaries (e.g., those in Hart's program, *Diction*) or originally created dictionaries. When creating custom dictionaries, be sure to first generate a frequencies list from your text sample and examine for key words and phrases.

Human
Coding

Computer
Coding